


# Jewish Post-War Problems

*A Study Course*

## UNIT VII

RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION  
AND MIGRATION



*Prepared by the*  
Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems  
*of*  
**THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE**  
386 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.

933.534

A 61  
cop.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE  
Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems

MAX GOTTSCHALK, *Director*

Jewish Post-War Problems

*A Study Course*

*This unit was prepared by the following members of the staff:*

MAX GOTTSCHALK

EUGENE HEVESI

SIMON SEGAL

MILTON HIMMELFARB

LOUIS SHUB

*and*

ABRAHAM G. DUKER, *Editor*

MICHAEL ALPER, *Assistant Editor*

*with the assistance of LIBBY BENEDICT and HAROLD J. JONAS.*

---

Copyright 1943 by the Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems  
of The American Jewish Committee

---

*Printed August 1943*

181

Price of Single Unit—10¢

Price of Entire Course—50¢

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION AND MIGRATION

	<i>Part A</i>	PAGE
<i>Introduction</i>		7
Part B		
1. APPROACHES TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JEWISH LIFE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD		8
a. The Automatic Approach		8
b. The Effects of War on Jews of the European Continent		9
c. Differences between Relief and Reconstruction		10
d. Emigration versus Reconstruction on the Spot		10
1. Solution by Emigration		11
2. Reconstruction on the Spot		11
3. Middle-of-the-Road Solution		12
2. SUBSISTENCE RELIEF		13
a. The Need and Types of Subsistence Relief		13
b. Activities During the Period of Subsistence Relief		14
c. Jewish Aspects of Subsistence Relief		15
d. The Problem of Repatriation		16
Part C		
3. RECONSTRUCTION ON THE SPOT		18
Part D		
4. RECONSTRUCTION IN WESTERN EUROPE		18
a. The General Problem		18
b. Reconstruction of Jewish Life		19
Part E		
5. RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE		21
a. The Present Situation of the Jews		21
b. Conditions for Jewish Reconstruction		21
1. Will the Jews Survive in Eastern Europe?		21
2. Will the Surviving Jews Remain?		21

c. The General Economic Situation in Eastern Europe before the Present War	22
d. The Economic Position of the Jews	24
e. Planning for the Future	25
1. General Reconstruction of Eastern Europe	25
2. Employment	25
3. The Retraining Program	27

*Part F*

6. RECONSTRUCTION IN GERMANY	28
------------------------------	----

*Part G*

7. RECONSTRUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.	28
-----------------------------------	----

*Part H*

8. RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH MIGRATION	29
-------------------------------------	----

a. Possible Motives for Emigration	29
1. Who Will Emigrate	30
2. Former and Prospective Emigrants	31
b. In Search of Refuge	32
1. Internal Migrations	32
2. Overseas Migrations	33
3. Suggested Homes before the Present War	33
c. Restrictionist Immigration Policies	33
1. The Record	33
2. Opposition to Immigration	34
3. Jews the Chief Victims of the Closed-Door Policy	34
4. International Action on Behalf of World War I Refugees	35
5. International Action on Behalf of German Refugees	35

*Part I*

9. POSITIVE FACTORS OPERATING IN FAVOR OF CHANGE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY	36
--	----

a. World Needs of Migration	37
1. Underpopulated Countries	38
2. Special Areas of Possible Group Settlement	38
3. Palestine	40
b. Individual versus Group Migrations	40
1. The Economy of the Settlements	41
2. The Types of Jewish Mass Settlement	41
3. Technical Problems in Resettlement	41
4. Organization of Post-War Migration	42

10. WHO WILL DO THE WORK?	42
a. General Organizations	42
b. Jewish Organizations and Personnel	43

*Selected Readings*

1. COMPARISON OF BEVERIDGE REPORT AND NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD REPORT	45
2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION —BY THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE	47
3. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE—Declaration of Principles	50
4. THE POST-WAR EUROPEAN ECONOMY —BY THE EDITORS OF "FORTUNE"	51
5. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RESTITUTION OF CONFISCATED PROPERTIES —By ERNEST MUNZ	55
6. NO SPECIAL RESTITUTION PRIVILEGES FOR JEWS —By HIRAM MOTHERWELL	57
7. NAZI STARVATION POLICY —By BORIS SHUB AND Z. WAHRHAFTIG	57
8. WILL THE SURVIVING JEWS MIGRATE? —By MAX GOTTSCHALK	60
9. PROPOSED SOLUTION BY MASS EVACUATION —By VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY	63
10. A TERRITORIALIST VIEW —By GABRIEL HAUS	66
11. A PLEA FOR CONTINUED RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION —By ROBERT MOSES	66
12. POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNAL MIGRATIONS TO WESTERN EUROPE —By ROBERT VACHER	68
13. PROGRAM FOR THE RESCUE OF JEWS FROM NAZI OCCUPIED EUROPE —By THE JOINT EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS	68
14. BERMUDA CONFERENCE JOINT COMMUNIQUE	70
15. REFUGEE AND IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES —By ILJA DIJOUR	71

16. AN ESTIMATE OF FINANCES REQUIRED FOR JEWISH RELIEF —BY A. MENES	74
17. REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY	77
(a) Bibliographies and Source Material	77
(b) Study Guides	77
(c) Relief and Rehabilitation	77
(d) Migration and Settlement	78
(e) Refugees	79
(f) Periodicals	79
(g) Other Sources	80

# RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION AND MIGRATION

## Part A

### Introduction

*... O ye dry bones, hear the word of the Lord: Thus saith the Lord God unto these bones: Behold, I will cause breath to enter into you, and ye shall live. And I will lay sinews upon you, and will bring flesh upon you, and cover you with skin, and put breath in you, and ye shall live; and ye shall know that I am the Lord.*

—Ezekiel, XXXVII, 4-6.

International political cooperation among the United Nations, and especially the four major partners—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China—is basic to the maintenance of peace. A durable peace, however, will depend not only on the political shape of the post-war world, but also on the economic and social life within its political framework.\* The future of the Jews is bound closely with the economic order of the world as a whole. Therefore, although this Unit will deal mainly with the rehabilitation of the Jewish victims of war through relief, economic reconstruction and migration, we shall also pay close attention to the wider economic problems.

Such rehabilitation, as we shall see, is generally conceived in two terms: (1) reconstruction of individual Jews and Jewish communities in their former homes or present places of exile; and (2) assistance in the emigration to other countries and regions of those individuals who will not be able or will not want to re-establish themselves in their present or pre-war domiciles.

We have emphasized a number of times in this Study Course that all our planning on post-war problems must be based upon the assumption that international cooperation between the United Nations will prevail in the post-war era. The implication of cooperation for the reconstruction of the economic life of individual Jews and of Jewish communities is obvious.

In the first place, an expanding economic order, developed with the aim of providing social security for all, will introduce an ever-rising standard of living, making for general prosperity.† Jews will benefit from this, as will all other individuals. In addition, the abolition of poverty, unemployment and economic instability, generally acknowledged to be the major factors contributing in a large measure to anti-Semitism, is bound to make the results of reconstruction more enduring. Furthermore, opportunities which would then be

\*See plans on International Economic Reconstruction, p. 47.

†See Comparison of Beveridge and N.R.P.B. Reports, p. 45.

open for regulated migration of masses of people, Jews and non-Jews alike, to those regions in need of development through settlement and investment are bound to affect Jews in a favorable way. It is obvious, nevertheless, that there will be many difficulties in restoring poverty-stricken Jewish populations to normal life.

In the second place, a world order based on international cooperation would provide the political framework for Jewish equality and the progressive abolition of anti-Semitism, which, in turn, would make large-scale ameliorative action for Jews feasible. Jews might be able to regain in some measure the properties, funds and positions lost through the operation of anti-Jewish laws, or because of the vicissitudes of war.

In the following chapters, therefore, we shall discuss the relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Jews, on the basis of a social and political world order built on cooperation among the nations. But we should bear in mind that even some of the most pressing problems will require more time for their solution than desirable. While the direction may be clear, the road will be hard and long.

## Part B

### 1. APPROACHES TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF JEWISH LIFE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

#### a. *The Automatic Approach*

Opinions have occasionally been expressed that no special efforts will be needed to render relief to Jews in Europe and other war-stricken areas or to help them reconstruct their lives in a post-war world based on international cooperation. A social order founded on equality and democracy, it is held, would automatically apply the benefits of relief and economic reconstruction to Jews and non-Jews alike.

As we have previously pointed out, those who so regard Jewish post-war problems are not realistic. In Units I and V we explained that it is possible strong residues of anti-Semitism will remain among the populations of Europe. Even those observers who feel that this residual anti-Semitism would of itself not be sufficient to cause great harm to the European Jewish community, warn that in the event of our failure to realize a progressive economy, active anti-Semitism would flare up again. Special efforts will be required, to protect Jewish rights in specific areas and to educate against bigotry, more generally. There is a danger that those planning for the world of the future may disregard Jewish problems, unless the Jewish and non-Jewish public are aware of them.

In the following sections we shall consider how various economic conditions are likely to affect the Jews after the war, and how we can best plan for the resulting emergency on the longer-range needs.

*b. Effects of the War on the Jews of the European Continent*

What is likely to be the situation of the Jews in the war-torn areas immediately following the victory of the United Nations?

Hitler's domination of Europe has brought with it destruction and grief on a scale unparalleled in history. His war of conquest has already cost the lives of millions of soldiers and civilians. Many countries have been overrun and whole people enslaved. Executions, starvation and disease have become the norm under the Nazis.

But horrifying as is the condition of Europe's enslaved nations, the plight of the Jews of Europe surpasses in tragedy anything that has befallen others. Hitler has subjugated entire nations, but he does not plan to destroy them completely. The Nazi war machine and German economy generally are making full use of the labor which the populations of the conquered nations can supply. To the general European population, therefore, the present Nazi tyranny means a temporary enslavement which they know is certain to end with the liberation of the continent by the armies of the United Nations.

The situation is quite different with the Jewish population in Europe. The material basis of its existence has been completely shattered by confiscation and outright robbery. The majority of the Jews in Europe no longer reside in the places where they lived in 1939. Jews from almost all of Europe—Western and Southern—were and are being deported to the Nazi-occupied Polish and Soviet provinces.

At least a million and a half Jews in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the Ukraine and White Russia—formerly regions belonging to or incorporated into the Soviet Union—were caught in 1941 in the trap of the suddenly advancing German armies. Roumania has deported several hundred thousands of Jews to areas seized from Russia. Thousands, principally from Hungary and Roumania, are working in labor battalions on the Russian front. And this is not all. Over the heads of millions of Jews hangs the sentence of wholesale annihilation. Children, the old and sick are massacred outright. The able-bodied are compelled to do the meanest and most physically debilitating slave work. Under inhumane conditions and as virtual slaves of the owners, they toil for a pittance in Nazi factories. Still others work for the Nazi war machine in labor camps or on Hitler's fortifications against the invasion. The position of the Jews in Hungary, a Nazi satellite, is fair—but only by comparison. No wholesale deportations or massacres have taken place in that country.

The great majority of the European Jews are slowly starving to death on reduced rations. According to Polish government sources, the daily food ration of a German, at the end of 1941, was equivalent to 2,500 calories, while a Warsaw Pole received 981 calories. Jews at this time were reduced to a diet of only 260 calories! And, it should be observed, these standards prevailed before the Nazis began their real war of extermination against the Polish Jews. This war has now been accelerated. These modern ghettos in which Jews were concentrated to facilitate their extermination are being steadily emptied and their inhabitants killed off by special Nazi and quisling squads.\*

\*See Nazi Starvation Policy, p. 57.

The only intact Jewish communities on the European continent are those in Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, Portugal, Denmark and the unoccupied regions of the Soviet Union. The suffering of the Jews in the Soviet Union has, of course, been especially great in combat areas, where, however, the plight of the general population has been equally serious. This was true particularly in besieged Leningrad with an estimated Jewish population of over 200,000. Almost half a million Jews from Soviet-occupied Poland, many of whom refused to accept Soviet citizenship, escaped Nazi rule by their removal to the Asiatic regions of the U.S.S.R. in 1940. In addition, it is also likely that over a million Jews from the Nazi-occupied regions of the Soviet Union managed to escape to the Soviet interior.

In the light of these facts, it can be seen that European Jewry will emerge from this war at best greatly impoverished, health undermined and drastically reduced in numbers. Some pessimists even venture to predict the complete doom of all the Jews under Nazi rule. In our discussion of post-war relief and reconstruction, however, we must proceed on the assumption that many Jews, at least several millions, in addition to those who have managed to flee from the Nazi territories will somehow survive the war.

#### *c. Differences between Relief and Reconstruction*

We can see that the physical and economic situation of the Jews who survive the war in Europe and other areas will require far-reaching reconstructive measures. The practical difficulties of feeding, clothing and supplying medical relief and shelter, however, seem to be small in face of the greater task of reconstructing the lives of these war victims and rehabilitating them into healthy human beings capable of earning their own livelihoods.

The task of reconstructing the lives of the war victims, both Jews and non-Jews alike, is generally divided into two periods. The first is the period of immediate relief, when the starved populations of Europe, especially in the war zones, will require food, clothing, shelter and health accommodations. The second period will encompass the basic problem of reconstruction. It will be devoted to planned restoration of normal economic conditions with a consequent raising of production and the standards of living. In a way, this division corresponds, approximately, to the distinction indicated in Unit V, between the Transition Period of a number of years which most post-war planners think ought to elapse between the cessation of military hostilities and the final peace settlement, and the subsequent period of stabilization.

#### *d. Emigration versus Reconstruction on the Spot*

While few will question special Jewish needs for relief (these, as well as the technical problems involved, will be discussed below), there is no complete agreement among Jews on either the advisability or the method of the permanent reconstruction of the life of the Jews in Europe and other war areas. Opinion is divided along two lines. There are those who believe that reconstruction can and should be achieved primarily or exclusively through the emigration of Jews. There are others who hold that the task of reconstruction should be conducted primarily so as to restore Jews to a useful and

productive economic life *in the places where they lived* before the outbreak of the war or where they are residing today.

## 1. SOLUTION BY EMIGRATION

Those advocating emigration hold that the poverty of Europe and the difficulties of restoring a normal economic life following the war will be so great that it will be impossible to achieve any basic economic reconstruction without the emigration abroad of millions of people, both non-Jews and Jews. The greater impoverishment of the Jews, intensified by difficulties of regaining economic positions taken over by some elements in the local populations (for the Germans are not the only ones who have benefited from the change in ownership), will make emigration a stronger attraction for them. Any rekindled anti-Semitism, as we have pointed out, will aggravate the situation. Furthermore, advocates of emigration hold that many, possibly the majority of the surviving Jews will prefer, because of psychological and emotional reasons, to emigrate, rather than to remain where they now happen to be or to return to their former homes. Other Jews will want to join their relatives in the Americas, Palestine, the Soviet Union, and other places overseas. Still others will desire to face a complete readjustment of their lives in new places which are more prosperous, relatively free from economic tensions and prejudices and which will present fewer difficulties than those which will face them in a destitute Europe.

Zionists present the additional argument that large numbers of Jews, preferring to live in a completely Jewish milieu, will choose to go to Palestine in order to assure Jewish group survival by building their own National Home.\* This sentiment, they say, is bound to grow because the decimation of the Jewish population and the general social trends favoring assimilation make it impossible to restore the former cultural and religious centers in Europe. (This argument has been examined in Unit VI.) Revisionist Zionists,\*\* furthermore, advocate complete evacuation of Jews, at least from Eastern Europe, while most other Zionists urge a solution by large-scale but not total emigration. Zionists are not, however, the only proponents of the emigrationist solution.

The Territorialists' search for territories outside of Palestine is prompted by reasons similar to those advocated by Zionists.† Finally, there are the philanthropically-minded Jews motivated by humanitarian, rather than ideological, reasons.

## 2. RECONSTRUCTION ON THE SPOT

Those who favor the solution of the problem of the Jews by "reconstruction on the spot" envision the permanent readjustment of Jewish life in the countries where Jews have resided before the war or in the places where they will be living at the close of hostilities. The advocates of this view advance

\*See Unit VI, pp. 29-36.

\*\*See Proposed Solution by Mass Evacuation, by V. Jabotinsky, p. 63.

†See A Territorialist View, by Gabriel Haus, p. 66.

both practical and ideological reasons. They hold that it will be impossible to find room for millions of prospective Jewish emigrants if the overseas countries continue their present policy of restricting immigration or, at best, relax it only slightly. In addition to stressing the existence of the many bars to immigration, they also point to the anti-migration tendencies evinced at the Bermuda Conference for the solution of the refugee problem, held in May 1943.<sup>‡</sup> It has also been noted that government leaders of certain nations hold that the problem of the Jews in Europe ought to be settled by granting them complete equality rather than by emigration. Sir Herbert Emerson, League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, particularly stresses this point of view. This opinion is based upon the conclusion that the emigrationist solution is impractical in the light of the United Nations' policy. Those in favor of reconstruction on the spot also doubt that the Holy Land will be capable of receiving large numbers, even if there should be a possibility of changing the White Paper policy on Palestine.

An ideological objection to the solution by emigration is the argument that the Jewish group as citizens of the countries in which they resided have no more right to seek relief by emigration than non-Jews in the same communities. The acceptance by Jews of the emigrationist solution, the anti-emigrationists hold, would be equivalent to approving the anti-Semitic conception of the Jews as a perpetual stranger, for whom there was no place or status in Europe. It would, furthermore, seriously reflect on the position of Jews in the free countries and would be tantamount to a victory of the ideology of Hitlerism after the military defeat of Nazi Germany. Another less frequently advanced anti-emigrationist opinion is that Jews have a mission to return to their former countries in order to help in the restoration of democracy and equality.

### 3. THE MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD SOLUTION

Most thinking on the post-war reconstruction of Jews is not, however, limited to the choice between the extreme alternatives of (1) total evacuation or large-scale emigration; or (2) the proposal that the Jews of Europe either remain wherever they may be at the end of hostilities or return to their former homes. On the contrary, most statements by representative Jewish and non-Jewish authorities on the problem advocate a middle-of-the-road approach to the problem by leaving the choice between the alternatives to the people directly concerned. The advocates of this solution hold that those surviving Jews who, for whatever reasons, may prefer to reconstruct their lives by emigration, ought to receive full opportunity to do so. Other Jews who may wish either to remain wherever they happen to be or to return to their former countries should be equally entitled to the opportunity to follow their own choice. Their rights, moreover, should be fully protected, and they should receive all the aid needed for their economic adjustment. This point of view, therefore, upholds the principle that no one should be forced to live anywhere against his will.

This, in brief, is the point of view accepted by most Jewish thinkers on post-war problems; it appears most frequently in resolutions passed by Jewish

<sup>‡</sup>See Bermuda Conference Joint Communiqué, p. 70.

organizations. The subject of migrations will be considered in a later part of this Unit. We shall now return to the question of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

## 2. SUBSISTENCE RELIEF

### a. *The Need for and Types of Subsistence Relief*

From the discussion of the position in which Jews and other peoples in Europe are likely to find themselves after the cessation of hostilities, as well as from the recent experiences of the United Nations in French and Italian North Africa, it is evident that relief authorities will accompany or will soon follow the invading forces of the United Nations. These relief authorities will begin at once the task of distributing food and clothing, and of protecting the health of the exhausted and malnourished populations.

The various steps and problems in carrying out this humanitarian task have been outlined by experts in this field. It is their assumption that the first step in this feeding process will be the distribution of energy foods in large quantities so as to restore both the physical and mental health of the starved populations. Feeding standards are far from being satisfactory anywhere on the European continent occupied by the Nazis, and the problem of overcoming the damage already done is enormous. Children, especially, will require particular care, which will mean not merely the shipment of huge quantities of wheat and cereals but also of a large-scale distribution of meats, milk, cheese and other protein foods.

It is not expected that the job of feeding Europe during this period of subsistence relief will be solely that of the overseas countries. European agriculture will have to be brought back as soon as possible to its normal productive capacity. Additional efforts will have to be made to improve and vary European agriculture, because the backward agricultural and political policies of certain states before the war prevented it from becoming sufficiently developed and intensified. The war has, furthermore, ruined the major European food producing areas. For instance, according to the Soviet representatives at the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held in May 1943 in Hot Springs, Va., the Soviet Union, one of the major food producing countries before the present war, will require assistance in supplying food for "a considerable period of time" after the war.\*

Proper planning therefore requires the importation of huge quantities of seed, fertilizers, agricultural machinery, draft animals and oil for the tractors so that the second harvest after the cessation of hostilities should be able to supply Europe with a large portion of the needed food. Also, large numbers of animals and fowls for breeding and the necessary fodder will have to be imported, because livestock has been depleted either through Nazi confiscation or sabotage by resisting patriots. Since the least costly way of obtaining food is to grow it on the spot, plans have been proposed for the rapid introduction of large-scale mechanized agriculture in areas near Europe such as Iraq and Transjordan. Shortages in food and difficulties in administration may make it necessary for the relief administrators to continue food rationing for some time to come after the war.

\*See United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, p. 50.

Because the subjected people of Europe are ill-clad and ill-sheltered, an important task to be achieved during this stage will be the provision of clothing and shelter. New and secondhand clothing will have to be shipped in large quantities; advantage may be taken of surplus military stocks. The provision of housing in the ruined and bombed-out areas is expected to take a long time, and even to provide temporary shelter will require much energy and large resources.

Another major problem will be the prevention of epidemics, particularly cholera and typhus, as well as the threatened increase of tuberculosis. This will require a huge medical personnel, as well as the importation of serums, sulfa drugs and other medical supplies on a large scale. Vitamins will have to be supplied to overcome diseases resulting from food deficiencies.

Years of war have caused transportation facilities in Europe, including railroads, waterways, and ports, to be increasingly dislocated and destroyed. It is quite possible, therefore, that in the initial stage immediately following hostilities none of these facilities will suffice to meet the needs of both import and internal traffic. An improvement in the situation is bound to take place as the European population under the leadership of the United Nations begins to repair the damages. Nevertheless, it may be necessary to halt or restrict civilian migrations and non-relief shipping until sufficient facilities are made available. It has therefore been suggested that the expected large-scale repatriation of prisoners of war and inmates of concentration and labor camps as well as deportees and refugees may have to be postponed or carried out by degrees. The magnitude of the task of post-war planning can be gauged by the difficulties involved in first solving this knotty problem, which is but one of many.

#### *b. Activities during the Period of Subsistence Relief*

Even at this stage in the war certain actions taken on an international scale indicate that the planning for the distribution of subsistence relief is beginning to enter its practical stage. A Preliminary Wheat Agreement was signed in the Spring of 1942 by the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia, the four major wheat producing nations. These signatories agreed to create a pool of 100,000,000 bushels of wheat to be utilized for intergovernmental relief, and have arranged to furnish food free, whenever it may be necessary to do so. On November 21, 1942, President Roosevelt appointed former Governor Herbert H. Lehman as Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. While the final status of this new agency is not yet clear, its establishment is an indication of the serious interest of the Administration in the problem of feeding post-war Europe and other areas. If the American Congress supports it, this agency may become the leading instrument for carrying out the great humanitarian task of relief. In Great Britain, the Leith-Ross Commission was established with similar aims in 1941 and the Governments-in-Exile in London cooperate with it.

Several governments are planning the creation of large stocks of food to be shipped abroad immediately after the war. These activities would indicate a general policy different from the period of subsistence relief following World War I when private relief agencies carried out a large share of this task. It would seem that the present activity proceeds on the principle that the prob-

lem of preparing, collecting, shipping and distributing food is beyond the capacity of private agencies. This does not imply, however, that the services of private organizations such as the Red Cross, the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (J.D.C.) will not be called upon in the distribution of subsistence relief. While it is not yet known what roles have been assigned to them, the fact that governmental bodies have maintained contacts with these private organizations indicates that they will continue to play their part, although the major task will be carried out by governmental authorities. The proper conduct of large-scale relief requires an international central authority with trained personnel, to be established by the United Nations.

There is a general agreement, furthermore, among relief authorities that the task of feeding Europe in the post-war era will be too great to be carried out merely on the basis of available collected food. The cooperation of the populations in the overseas countries will be required as the people in the food-producing countries will have to share their food crops with the starved peoples of Europe. This will obviously require a sympathetic approach to the problem on the part of the peoples of the United States, Canada, Argentina and other countries. A poll conducted in England late in 1942 (and reported here on January 15, 1943) revealed that 79% of the population of Great Britain expressed a willingness to have the present strict rationing system continued as long as necessary after the war, in order to help the peoples on the continent. A poll of American opinion (June 1943) on retaining the rationing system for five years to help feed starving people in other countries showed 82% favoring such a proposal. It is hoped that the value of this sacrifice in terms of permanent peace will continue to be understood by the people of the United States and other countries, for food is a weapon in peace as in war.

It is too early to predict how this enormous task will be achieved. Some post-war planners are of the opinion that it will be carried out mainly by the military authorities in connection with the occupation of Europe. Others hold that the job should be turned over as quickly as possible to civilian authorities of the United Nations. Some believe that certain areas, such as the Axis countries, will have to be fed by the military, while the United Nations' territories ought to be cared for by the civilian authorities. Naturally, there are other aspects of the problem which have not been clarified, such as the financing of this task, which most agree will have to be done by international action.

### *c. Jewish Aspects of Subsistence Relief*

Jews have suffered most from the Nazi hegemony of Europe. They will therefore require special measures of alleviation, particularly in what remains of the Jewish population centers of Eastern Europe. We have observed that the Jews occupy the lowest place in the Nazi scheme of food rationing, that their food allowance produces but twenty percent of the normal requirement of calories. Poles, on the other hand, receive about sixty-one percent of the normal requirement; the French receive fifty-five percent. Jews will require special treatment in order to restore them to normal health.

We shall not be able to count much on East-European Jewish self-help in the matter of food, because not many Jews have been farmers, and because

German occupation has entirely dislocated Jewish life. Consequently, it will be our responsibility to avoid a repetition of what occurred after the last war, when in many localities Jews were forced to wander from village to village in quest of food.

Other factors must also be considered. The organization of local relief committees in the various communities will be of little use to Jews if proper steps are not taken by the administrators to avoid discrimination, as happened in Poland following World War I. This can be done by assuring Jewish representation on such bodies and by making certain that anti-Semitic elements are not represented. It must also be remembered that in most places Jews have been accustomed to a great degree of self-sufficiency in social services. In communities where Jews may prefer to run their own food kitchens and relief activities, with the assistance of the general relief organization, they should receive an opportunity to do so.

One of the greatest problems will be that of restoring the physical and mental health of the Jewish children. It cannot be solved merely by applying the general relief formula. (The number of Jewish war orphans and homeless children following World War I, for instance, was estimated to be between 150,000 to 200,000, and the figure is incomparably higher this time.) The proper method for the recuperation of these child victims would be to bring them up in a Jewish environment.

Physical and mental diseases are also likely to be rampant among the Jews in Europe. Recuperation and cure can best be attained in Jewish institutions, where medical and service staffs are acquainted with the language and background of the patients.

The problem of feeding Orthodox Jews cannot be solved without giving the proper consideration to their religious *Kashrut* practices. The *Shehitah* prohibitions prevalent throughout the occupied countries will, therefore, have to be abolished immediately if observant Jews are to benefit from the improved food conditions. Similarly, registration for the receipt of food on the Jewish Sabbath and holidays, or its distribution on these days, would be considered an act of discrimination by most of the Jews.

Thus we can see that there are a number of specific Jewish problems which the post-war relief administrators must consider and some of which will require the employment of Jewish relief workers.

#### *d. The Problem of Repatriation*

The problem of repatriation also has a number of specific Jewish aspects. While a great many Europeans—numbering millions—will have been forcibly removed from their homes to work in Germany and other places, almost all the Jews in Europe will have been uprooted and shifted about before the end of the war. We have also to consider the case of those Jewish refugees who have been unable to adjust themselves properly in their place of refuge or transit. Many of these deportees and refugees will seek to be repatriated immediately.

It is likely, however, that the task of repatriating Jews will be rendered immensely difficult by the fact that it will constitute only part of a gen-

eral population movement of unprecedented magnitude. In Poland, Poles from the western provinces 'incorporated' into the German Reich have been herded into the so-called Government General. In Germany itself there are at least eight million foreign workers and prisoners of war. No doubt, all of these uprooted peoples will want to return to their homes as quickly as possible. Territorial changes resulting from the war may lead to large-scale shifts of population also requiring special consideration. The migration of these masses will need to be carefully organized and controlled. The problem will be complicated further by the transportation difficulties and the lack of homes and shelters.

The most difficult aspect of the problem of Jewish rehabilitation and resettlement will be that of the Jews stranded in Poland, Roumania, and the occupied Soviet regions. It is too early to suggest any methods for the solution of this matter. For those who will desire to emigrate to new places, it may be desirable to prepare them for emigration in the places where they are found residing at the close of the war. If any priorities are to be introduced within the process of repatriation, however, justice demands that special consideration be given to the tortured and enfeebled masses of the ghettos and concentration camps, to be followed by the inmates of labor camps. Protection against discrimination will have to be assured to the repatriated Jews. The voluntary migration of individuals now resident in the free countries may therefore have to be postponed until these sorely oppressed masses in Europe are repatriated.

In the opinion of specialists in this field, a mass movement of this type must be carried out on a planned group basis, for they agree that repatriation on an individual basis would cause general confusion as well as great hardships for the individuals.

The clarification of the legal status of the deportees and refugees desiring to return to their homelands, and of their right to do so, will have to precede repatriation. The matter of restoring citizenship to former Jewish nationals and recognizing the right of domicile of former Jewish residents will have to be considered by whoever governs the post-war states as a question of immediate importance. This may mean that the national frontiers of the various states in Europe will have to be established at least on a provisional basis before the machinery for repatriation is set in motion.

## *Part C*

### 3. RECONSTRUCTION ON THE SPOT

Subsistence relief is a most essential undertaking, but it should be considered as merely the introductory phase of the longer and more complicated task of economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.\* This more basic problem especially concerns those Jews who remain in Europe, either because they desire to do so or will be forced to stay because of barriers to emigration.

International economic cooperation on the basis of a just and democratic political order would make it possible to restore and receive the economic life of the Jews which has been destroyed by the Nazis and the war. While it is impossible at the present stage of the conflict to plan in detail for Jewish reconstruction, particularly in view of the danger of the continued decimation of the Jewish people in Europe, broad outlines of the task ahead have already been projected. Most of these plans divide the specific areas of Jewish reconstruction in Europe into four groupings: (1) Western Europe, which includes France, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands and Italy; (2) Eastern Europe, which includes Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia; (3) Germany and Austria; (4) the Soviet Union.

## *Part D*

### 4. RECONSTRUCTION IN WESTERN EUROPE

#### *a. The General Problem*

The dislocations caused by the present war exceed anything ever known before. We cannot adequately describe what has happened to the economic life of Western Europe alone. What has not been destroyed or threatened with destruction by Allied bombers, what has not been halted or depleted in the interests of Nazi economy, or transferred to Germany, has been integrated into Hitler's war machine. Between Nazi confiscation and control, on the one hand, and collaborationist cooperation, on the other, the undermining of the economic structure of Western Europe is complete.

Because of the thoroughgoing industrialization of Western Europe, the process of reconstruction must emphasize the re-establishment of industrial production. To accomplish this, raw materials must be imported, a process dependent upon the availability of shipping and, to a certain degree, upon the reconquest of Japanese-held possessions in the Pacific. Destroyed plants must be rebuilt; tools and machines must be secured, particularly from the United States. To finance these operations capital will have to be secured, principally through international loans. Financial stability must be achieved through a stable currency, or else the whole structure is threatened.

\*See Post-War European Economy, p. 51.

An additional complication will arise in extricating the ownership of banks, plants and industries from the maze of Nazi collaborationist control.\*

### *b. Reconstruction of Jewish Life*

Unlike those in Eastern Europe, the Jewish communities in Western and Central Europe were relatively small in relation to the total population. At the outbreak of the war there were over 300,000 Jews living in France, about 90,000 in Belgium, less than 3,000 in Norway, about 180,000 in the Netherlands, and over 50,000 in Italy. The Jews of these countries had been emancipated for generations; they showed far-reaching tendencies toward assimilation; the majority belonged to the middle classes. Their birth rate was consistently low, and if not for the continuous immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, the Jewish communities would have undergone a steady numerical decline. On the other hand, these centers had long played the role of the protector and benefactor of persecuted and poorer communities elsewhere.

But the present war has witnessed a radical change in the position of these once-favored communities. At the beginning of the Nazi occupation of Western Europe the treatment of the native Jews was relatively milder than that accorded Jews in the East. The first Jews to be deported were the immigrants from Eastern Europe. Only in 1942 did the wholesale shipment of native Jews to other parts begin. Since then large numbers of Jews have been deported. It is estimated that only 200,000 Jews remained in France in 1943; 8,000 in Belgium; 60,000 in the Netherlands; and from Luxembourg all Jews are reported to have been removed. Thus far, only the Italian Jews have been spared the ordeal of deportation to the East. Those hapless Jews who have survived the experience of deportation have been concentrated in the Eastern regions of Nazi-occupied Poland and the occupied territories of the U.S.S.R.

It is clear therefore that the reconstruction of Jewish life in the countries of Western Europe will depend primarily on the following factors: (1) the extent of continued deportations; (2) the ability of the deported Jews to survive their present ordeal; (3) the desire of the deported Jews and refugees to return to their former homelands; (4) the provisions for speedy repatriation; and (5) the possibilities of economic adjustment in these countries.

It is quite likely that the policy of deporting Jews may continue, with the possible exception of those residing in Italy as well as certain privileged categories in France and Belgium. There is little that we can add concerning the possibility of the survival of the deportees in their places of forced residence and hard labor. Proceeding, however, upon the optimistic assumption that a part of them, let us hope a large proportion, will manage to survive, there is no question that many, certainly the majority of these former residents will prefer to return to their homelands in Western Europe. It is also possible that immigrant Jews formerly residing in countries like France and Belgium will want to take up their lives again in these lands.

In view of the limited number of Jews in the pre-war period, as well as their present numerical decline, the problem of their return and readjustment is not to be considered as involving large masses. As we indicated in our discussion

\*See *Proposal for Restitution*, by E. Munz, p. 55; *No Special Restitution Privileges for Jews*, by H. Motherwell, p. 57.

on repatriation, a just approach to the problem of their reconstruction requires that these Jews, like all other deported Jews, receive urgent consideration in repatriation.

Because of the limited number and the occupational status of these Jews, it is generally thought that their economic reconstruction will not be faced by any unusual obstacles. The historic liberal tradition of most of Western Europe will also prove a factor favorable to adjustment. Reports lead us to believe that the Nazi occupation has resulted in a reaction against anti-Jewish sentiment. If there is no repetition in these countries of the North African experience following the successful landing by the Americans, no grave problems resulting from anti-Semitism are likely to face the Jews. (Even after the American invasion of North Africa in November 1942 had led to the overthrow of the local Vichy regime, the new American-approved local administration did not restore French citizenship to the Jews. Instead, it continued in effect the Vichy abolition of the Cremieux Decree, which had given French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria in 1870.) Of course, some measures of education against anti-Semitism may be necessary ever there. The fact that Jews have played such an important role in industry, commerce, the skilled trades and the professions before the war will make their contribution to the economic recovery of the region under discussion highly desirable and more quickly feasible than elsewhere. Efforts by authorities to secure the post-war return to Belgium of the Jewish diamond dealers who fled to the United States, England and Palestine provide but one example of official appreciation of the possible contributions Jews can make to the restoration of the normal economy of a country.

There are, however, some particular problems pertaining to economic reconstruction which are likely to affect Jews more than the general population. For example, Jews have suffered most from Nazi confiscatory legislation. This matter has already inspired statements on the restoration of Jewish equality by various Governments-in-Exile, as well as legislation by some of them. Some of these same governments have declared themselves in favor of returning property to the rightful owners, who of course, include Jews. We can assume that these official acts reflect the attitudes of the majority of the peoples in the land represented by the Governments-in-Exile. Since measures providing for compensation and the restoration of property will be carried out within a democratic framework, it is expected that the economic readjustment of the Jews will be facilitated. As we have seen, those who are studying post-war Jewish problems do not visualize any special difficulties for Jews in these areas, which will require specific, major international cooperation to overcome.

The problem of restoring Jewish cultural and communal life will, however, present a definite task to Jewish organizations; the help of the various governments is expected in this task.

## 5. RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE

### a. *The Present Situation of the Jews*

In contrast to Western Europe, the East European region—including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia—was for centuries the center of Jewish population in the world and remained a major center even after the rise of the large communities overseas. The number of Jews in this region, as we have seen, has been drastically reduced by Nazi extermination and deportation, although many Jews here as well as in both Polish and Soviet White Russia and Ukraine have been fortunate in escaping to the Russian interior. While deportation does not necessarily mean extermination, since many of the deportees are drafted for slave labor and others are permitted to live as best they can, it is nevertheless clear that unless victory comes very soon the Jewish population in these regions will emerge radically reduced in numbers. The only Axis country in this area where the position of Jews is comparatively bearable is Hungary, whose Jewish population increased greatly by the acquisition of Czechoslovak and Roumanian territories, and where deportation has been practiced only on a small scale.

### b. *Conditions for Jewish Reconstruction*

As in the West, so in planning for the reconstruction of the Jewish communities in the East, we must give due attention to the following factors: the ability of both the deported and native Jews to survive their present ordeal; the willingness of those who have been uprooted everywhere in Europe to return to their homelands; the provisions for their speedy repatriation; the tempo of general reconstruction of this region; and the ability to undertake a large-scale program of occupational retraining for Jews, made necessary by their particular economic structure.

### 1. WILL THE JEWS SURVIVE IN EASTERN EUROPE?

In our discussion of this first factor, we must rely on hope rather than fact, because the situation of the Jews in this region is not exactly known. Without question, however, the end of the war will reveal a drastic reduction in their numbers. Nor can it be doubted that the number of survivors will depend on the speed with which Hitler is defeated and on the specific measures undertaken now by the United Nations to save as many as possible.\* Proceeding, as heretofore, from the optimistic assumption that a large number—let us hope at least half—will survive, we can see that the problem of reconstruction is likely to be one of mass magnitude, for it would have to deal with two to three million people.

### 2. WILL THE SURVIVING JEWS REMAIN?

This question, too, cannot be answered definitely. We must remember that the trend towards emigration has always been strong among East Euro-

\*See Program for the Rescue of Jews from Nazi Occupied Europe, p. 68; see also p. 70.

pean Jews. Now many have relatives in the Americas, Palestine and other overseas countries and will want to join them. Others will wish to leave what was to them a torture chamber. Zionist sentiment, fairly strong there, is also bound to give strength to the emigration drive. Of the many who, having found shelter in the Soviet Union, have been able to adjust themselves, some may send for their relatives, if the Soviet government changes its policy of hermetically closed doors to immigration.

On the other hand, many Jews, notably Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Hungarian, will be inclined to remain in their homelands or to return to them. The reasons may be interests of property, occupation and income, a high degree of cultural assimilation and the concomitant feeling of belonging. The latter may be accentuated, in some cases, by a self-dedication to the task of building a better economic and political order. This may also be true of a proportionately smaller number of Polish and other Jews. Fear of change and of the hardships of migration and pioneer life may also be contributing factors.

Most of the East European refugees settled in the United States, parts of Latin America, England and Palestine will probably remain in their new homes. But there may be a limited number among them who, unable or unwilling to adjust themselves to the new conditions, will seek to return to Eastern Europe.

Naturally, the factors operating in favor of the emigrationist solution must be viewed in terms of changes in the policy of the immigrant-receiving countries and the likelihood of a revision of Great Britain's White Paper policy on Palestine. If restrictions against immigration are lifted and large-scale settlement opportunities are created in the overseas countries, more Jews will want to emigrate. If, on the other hand, the Jews in these regions have no choice but readjustment on the spot, reconstruction will naturally be needed on a much larger scale.

#### *c. The General Economic Situation in Eastern Europe before the Present War*

To answer the vital question whether reconstruction of Jewish life in Eastern Europe is possible, and to what degree it may be possible, we must first have a clear understanding of the total social-economic structure of the area before the Hitler conquests, as well as of the general outlook for its reconstruction and, within this framework, of the social-economic position of the Jews.

The most significant economic aspects of this area are its predominantly agrarian character, the relatively low yield of its cultivated soil, the narrow range of its crops and the density of its peasant population. The latter is two to five times higher than in Western Europe, constituting between 65% and 80% of the total population. At the same time, the net yield of agricultural produce per cultivated acre is from two to three times as low as in the West.

As a result, a low standard of living prevails. During the period 1925-1934, the index of real income of the gainfully employed was 1,069 in Great

Britain, 684 in France, 646 in Germany; but 359 in Hungary, 352 in Poland and 243 in Roumania. Moreover, the natural increase in Eastern Europe has been estimated to be about three times as high as in the West.

Before the First World War, this rapid natural increase was offset by mass emigration. Besides easing population pressure by their departure, the emigrants also used to send sizeable sums of money to their relatives in the old country. Since 1924, however, when the United States adopted the Immigration Quota Law, and other countries traditionally open to immigration followed suit, the average annual East European emigration between 1925 and 1939 fell to less than 15% of the average between 1890 and 1914. Emigration no longer performed the same balancing function as before in the economic life of the area; the population growth exceeded the increase in its agricultural and industrial production, with a resultant further constant decline in the standard of living. To the great detriment of general welfare armament expenditures in some of the countries took from 30% to 40% of the national income.

There are a number of reasons for the economic backwardness of Eastern Europe, one of which was the failure of the different countries to exploit their natural resources. That they are richly endowed cannot be denied. The Danube Basin, for instance, is fertile in its soil, rich in water power and in such raw materials as coal and oil. Poland has more coal and lignite deposits than any country in Europe, except Great Britain and Germany. Hungary has about one-fourth of the total world deposits of bauxite. Roumania has rich mineral deposits; and Yugoslavia, copper, lead, zinc and bauxite. None of these countries, however, even approached full use of its resources.

The total natural wealth of the East European region is greater than that of Germany, yet Germany's population enjoyed a much higher standard of living.

No development of natural resources is possible without capital. This in turn implies foreign investments, for no small agrarian country is capable of financing large-scale industrial undertakings on its own. The Western capital-exporting centers, however, invested relatively little in Eastern Europe because of what was considered greater investment security elsewhere. Much of this was due to political factors. Eastern Europe, since the breakup of the large political-economic units of Russia and Austria-Hungary, following World War I, became an area of small states, with irredentist minority populations and uncertain boundaries. Motivated by these political factors, each state felt itself forced into attempts at economic self-sufficiency (autarchy). The investment of foreign capital was thereby discouraged.

Before the First World War, most of the land had been owned by the aristocracy, which exploited the increasingly landless and fast multiplying peasantry, impoverished and backward. In Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania, far-reaching agrarian reforms (redistribution of land) were achieved after the First World War. In the first three countries reforms were easily effected because the landowners were predominantly Russian and German; in the last three, Magyars and Germans were more greatly affected than ethnically native landowners. A very limited measure of agrarian reform was undertaken in Poland, where some large estates were distributed among the peasants. The Polish government in the main, however,

restricted reform to estates owned by Russians, Germans and Jews, and generally left the Polish Catholic aristocracy undisturbed. Hungary, where the large landowners were mainly Magyars, had almost no agrarian reform; Jewish-owned properties, however, were distributed among the peasants in 1942-43 as a result of "Aryanization." Hungary preserved the political influence of the land-owning gentry, traditionally contemptuous of middle-class and professional occupations and socially reactionary, although not hostile to the economic activity of Jews. In other countries, middle-class development met with fewer difficulties. There was a substantial Czech middle class in Czechoslovakia, and the beginnings of a Polish Catholic middle class in Poland can be traced to the 19th century.

Attempts at industrialization were made both before World War I and after. In spite of the limited industrial capital at their disposal, however, the small nations of Eastern Europe were wasteful in their quest for an elusive "self-sufficiency," especially after the war.

Their lack of industrial success can also be traced in some measure to curbing the participation of Jews in economic life. The outstanding examples were furnished by Poland and Roumania.

#### *d. The Economic Position of the Jews*

The economic and political trends in Eastern Europe between the two wars were comprehensively discussed in Unit IV. The nationalism and the economic decline of the countries of Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the restriction against immigration in overseas countries, on the other, made it impossible for Jews, except those of Czechoslovakia, to adjust satisfactorily after the First World War. Industrialization was slow, and whenever industrial jobs became available, the government, and frequently employers and Christian workers, prevented Jews from obtaining them. The policy of autarchy brought with it increasing government control over most aspects of economic life. A further limitation of economic opportunities for Jews resulted. Because of overcrowding on the farms, there was little room for Jews in agriculture. (Despite this limitation, and in face of the policy of reserving the "sacred soil" of the fatherland for the ethnic and Christian majorities, the number of Jews who earned their living from various kinds of farming was increasing slowly.) A *numerus clausus* prevailed in the civil and military services as well as in the public utilities, most of which were state-owned or controlled. Jews were also restricted in the professions through limited access to the universities, professional schools, the bar and medical practice. An incessant boycott agitation was conducted against them, frequently with the encouragement of the government. Moreover, the rise in popular education brought about an increase in the number of literate peasants flocking to the cities in search of opportunities. Most of the governments attempted to make room in urban occupations by eliminating the Jews. The Christian middle classes grew rapidly; and their spokesmen along with the Church and the governments, utilized anti-Semitic propaganda to drive out Jewish competition. The peasant consumers' and producers' cooperative movements, limited the fight against private competition to Jews, and at the same time gave no employment to Jewish store managers and white-collar workers. Expanding government control over foreign trade, was another means of displacing

the new regional government (or governments), which will probably be dominated by members of the United Nations—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Even all the victorious countries may not be completely satisfied. Poland may lose her Ukrainian and White Russian regions to the U.S.S.R. Thus territorial grievances real or otherwise may be exploited by Fascists, anti-Semites and collaborationists. All these factors are likely to produce internal difficulties for some time and without doubt will be largely expressed in inter-group strife and anti-Semitism, which will interfere with Jewish economic reconstruction. The strains produced by the return of Nazi- and Quisling-confiscated properties to their rightful owners and by such far-reaching economic measures as agrarian reform and socialization will further impede smooth adjustment. Moreover, industrialization, which is a key to prosperity and obviously a major solution of agrarian overcrowding, cannot be carried out speedily, if only because of the immediate post-war difficulties. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Eastern Europe may remain for a long time a predominantly agrarian region, with the attendant evils for the Jews, who are predominantly urban. In addition, economic coordination through a customs union, and even more so through federalism, requires planning and government control in many areas of economic life. This trend is bound greatly to affect private initiative in commerce and industry, fields of traditional Jewish activity. Vigilance against economic discrimination will therefore have to be exercised for a long time, to prevent artificial barriers against the participation of Jews in the new economy.

On the other hand, regional reconstruction in Eastern Europe will be in great need of specific skills, initiative, contacts and capital. The Nazi policy of exterminating the economic experts, intellectuals and professionals of the vanquished populations has been particularly vicious and efficient here. The governments and society of this region will require, after liberation, large numbers of economic experts, a reliable civil service, dependable teachers, lawyers, physicians, journalists and social workers.

In addition to the federal, state and municipal functions which characterize the civil services in the United States, those of Eastern Europe include public utilities, communications and social services. A democratic order should guarantee full opportunities to all in the civil services and the professions. No doubt special facilities will be created by the new governments to train people for such positions rapidly. Equal treatment of Jews would contribute to the solution of the economic problem of their youth.

A factor of significance to the Jews will be the extent of socialization and control of finance, commerce and industry, the last two of which are likely to provide more opportunities for employment than the professions and civil services.

The resumption of industrial and commercial activities will afford more opportunities for Jews, many of whom have had experience and have pioneered in these fields in Europe, the overseas countries and the U.S.S.R. (in which country they have made significant contributions in production and distribution). The first to benefit from the gradual reopening of plants supplying industrial goods will be the skilled workers. Because of their economic usefulness to the Nazis, a greater proportion of Jews in these occupational groups is likely to survive than in others.

The problem of restoring the ownership of confiscated large commercial and industrial establishments is more knotty, involving as it does further difficulties of reparation and compensation.

The ownership or management of large industrial and commercial establishments can at best solve the problems of a select and relatively small number of persons. The mass problem of the hundreds of thousands of Jews previously engaged in petty commerce and unskilled occupations, as well as of the large number of chronically unemployed, must still be faced. Retailing will be essential to the restoration of economic normality, either along the lines of free initiative or management of state-owned or cooperative establishments. Here, too, many Jews may secure employment.

New commercial opportunities may be created. The introduction of new commodities, methods and formulas of production, as well as the increased consumption of all products, may create commercial employment opportunities. The planning and proper help of a Jewish reconstruction agency would make it possible for Jewish technicians, industrialists and merchants to pioneer in this field. It has also been suggested that commercial connections with manufacturing, export or import houses in the Western countries should be systematically planned and established.

### 3. THE RETRAINING PROGRAM

These employment openings cannot, however, take care of the needs of all. It is generally agreed, therefore, that an occupational retraining program will be required. This task, according to many students, ought to be directed toward preparation for resettlement and emigration, and readjustment on the spot. That retraining is needed is further emphasized by the danger that improved business conditions may increase the temptation to return *en masse* to petty commerce. This would result once again in the old occupational one-sidedness.

It is generally agreed that a thorough retraining program should begin as soon as possible after liberation. During the period of subsistence relief, retraining could also be usefully employed in occupational therapy, since handing out relief to idle people will not hasten their rehabilitation. Retraining centers, therefore, might be established in conveniently located places in Eastern Europe. In view of the difficulties of repatriation and feeding during the Relief Period, some advocate their establishment in the present areas of Jewish concentration. The program of retraining, according to a number of planners, should aim at directing Jews out of overcrowded economic areas into less competitive avenues of livelihood. Many view commercial occupations as "unproductive," and see in the retraining process a means of making Jews "productive" workers. It is uniformly agreed, however, that a return to the land can in no way be considered a major solution for unemployed Jews in Eastern Europe. Even the most radical land reforms will not satisfy the needs of the huge landless peasant population. It is believed that training in agriculture should be undertaken primarily as a preparation for emigration to Palestine or elsewhere overseas.

## 6. RECONSTRUCTION IN GERMANY

A difficult question will arise in connection with repatriation for German Jews. Should Germany, the home of racism, be entirely disregarded as a land in which Jews could take up residence? Many Jews, if not most, cannot easily contemplate living in that country. Besides, the German people, so many of whom supported Hitler and were brought up to believe that Jews are an inferior race and their implacable enemies, may for a long time not make it pleasant for Jews to live in their midst.

At the outbreak of the war, a majority of the German Jews, especially the young and able-bodied, had left. Of the rest, it is estimated that only about 30,000 remained in Germany in 1943, the others having died or been deported East. While a mass return of Jews to Germany is not expected, it is likely that some may wish to go back. Much will depend on the political and social order, on the length of time needed for the emergence of democracy and on immigration possibilities elsewhere. Some Jews may want to return in order to regain their property. Others, identified with German culture, life and politics, may wish to participate in the introduction of a new social order. Still others believe that the absence of Jews from Germany would be a victory for Hitler after his defeat. Others feel that the old historical Jewish community of Germany should continue. The treatment accorded to the returning Jews by the German population will serve as an index of Germany's recovery from Nazism and as a measure of her return to the decencies of civilized life. Thus far, however, few are of the opinion that the readjustment of this limited number of Jews will require much planning or communal assistance by Jewish organizations.

## 7. RECONSTRUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Substantially different are the considerations of economic reconstruction for the Jews in the Soviet Union. As in other areas, their problem will largely depend on the length of the war. It is estimated that between one and a half and two million Jewish residents of the original Soviet areas (Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea, and Great Russia) and territories incorporated by the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941 (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Polish White Russia and Polish Ukraine) were trapped by the Nazis. We cannot know how many have died, or how many will survive.

Although the unsettled citizenship of the Jews from Poland now in the U.S.S.R. has to be taken into consideration, the problem of restoring Jews to their normal lives, either in their former or present places of residence, or in new locations, is naturally one to be solved primarily by the Soviet Government. Much will therefore depend on Soviet policy toward foreign aid

in relief and rehabilitation. After the First World War, the Soviet Union benefited greatly from the operation of such organizations as the American Relief Administration (A.R.A.) and the Joint Distribution Committee (J.D.C.), which were permitted to operate in Russia under government control and with the assistance of local organizations. Because the problem of reconstructing Jewish life became pressing, following the economic dislocation evoked by the civil wars and the drastic process of Sovietization, the Soviet government permitted the Jewish Colonization Association (I.C.A.) and the Agro-Joint, a subsidiary of the J.D.C., to assist financially and administratively in the projected mass land-settlement of Jews in the Ukraine, White Russia and Crimea. This assistance was finally discontinued, by the decision of the Soviet Government, in 1938. When the Soviet Union initiated the settlement of the autonomous Jewish territory of Biro-Bidjan in 1928 it did not permit foreign Jewish organizations to operate there. The prohibition against foreign organizations is still in force.

It is impossible now to know what the attitude of the Soviet Union will be after the war. Among the thousands of refugee Jews that have found refuge in the Soviet Union are many who may fall into the category of the economically declassed such as former tradesmen. Will Russia undertake the "productivization" of these Jews or will she seek their repatriation to their former homes? Will she accept the assistance of foreign Jewish and other relief organizations, or will the Soviets proceed exclusively on their own in taking care of the displaced Jews, as of others? At any rate we must remember that the possibilities of economic readjustment in the Soviet Union, which despite terrible losses has great natural riches, and where there is racial and national equality, are quite different from those in poverty-stricken and hate-pervaded Europe. The attitude of the Jews in the U.S.S.R. towards their reconstruction there will be taken up below.

## Part H

### 8. RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH MIGRATION

#### a. Possible Motives for Emigration

We have touched in this Study Course on the motives which may prompt the surviving Jews in Europe as in other war-torn parts of the world to reconstruct their lives by emigration, rather than to remain in their present places of exile or shelter, or to return to their former countries, from whence they were driven by Nazi or quisling terror. We have also indicated the differences of opinion existing among Jews concerning the choice of solutions.\*

\*See Will the Surviving Jews Migrate? by Max Gottaehalk, p. 60; see also pp. 63, 66; A Bundist View, Unit V, p. 56; and Unit VI, pp. 29-36.

As we have seen, the point of view most commonly accepted is the middle-of-the-road position, based on the democratic approach of free choice, and asserting that Jews in the war areas ought to be given both the right and the opportunity to restore their lives either in Europe or overseas, according to their own preference. Even the opponents of the emigrationist solution admit that migration is bound to provide the way out for many Jews, although they continue to object to any plans which would, however benevolently, single the Jews out for evacuation or mass exodus. On the other hand, even the extremist advocates of the solution by emigration insist on the right of Jews to remain in Europe and expect that some will remain.

### 1. WHO WILL EMIGRATE?

Again we must base our thinking on hope rather than on fact. The number of prospective Jewish emigrants from the Nazi- and Axis-occupied areas will depend primarily on the ability of the Jews to survive. The two determining factors are, as we have explained, the length of the war and the interest of the United Nations in rescuing the European Jews. While the majority of those Jews of Western Europe, most of Czechoslovakia and ethnic Hungary, who will be fortunate enough to live to see victory are expected to seek their adjustment in their former countries, the same cannot be said for those of most of Eastern Europe. Even granted good possibilities for reconstruction in their former countries, masses of them will prefer to emigrate. Within this category are the Polish, Roumanian, Slovak and Carpatho-Ruthenian Jews (the last under Hungary). Because of continuing deportation and extermination, it is impossible now to treat the problem in terms of numbers.

In addition to the Jews of these countries, there are sizeable numbers of prospective Jewish emigrants not at present under the Nazi heel. Most of the 20,000 refugees (mainly from Germany) now living in the Japanese-held Shanghai ghetto do not expect to remain in China after the war. Spain and Portugal harbor about 8,000 Jews who are waiting for the opportunity to emigrate or to be repatriated. There are more than 10,000 Jewish refugees in Switzerland. Many refugees at present in Great Britain have been permitted to remain there for the duration of the war only.

Of the 6,000 European Jews in North Africa most do not expect to stay, and some native Jews, particularly Moroccan and Libyan, may prefer to emigrate. Some thirty thousand Jews in Yemen, living in medieval degradation, and a score of thousands in Iraq, some of whom in 1941 experienced the horrible Baghdad pogrom staged by Arab Axis-followers, would emigrate, preferably to Palestine, if given the opportunity. It is also possible that economic and political development in the Arab states of Syria and Lebanon, as well as in Persia and Afghanistan, will make emigration preferable to many Jews. The continuation of the White Paper policy in Palestine, according to some observers, is bound to raise a serious emigration problem for many Jews in the Holy Land. Some would refuse to live in what they would consider the ghetto of a permanent and decreasing Jewish minority in what they fear would be a primitive and intolerant Arab Islamic state. The failures of minority protection in modern Europe give them no assurance of future safety in an Arab environ-

ment. They point to threats and declarations by Arab leaders, calling for a drastic reduction in the numbers and influence of the Jewish community in Palestine. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that conditions resulting from the inability of the Jews to plan their own economic future under the White Paper policy of discouraging the industrial growth of Palestine will lead to the reduction of their economic opportunities and living standards.

In a different category are the prospective Jewish emigrants living in the Soviet Union. While Jews in the U.S.S.R. enjoy complete political and economic equality, many, because of religious, ideological and family reasons, would choose to leave, if given the opportunity. The most urgent plight of all is that of the Jewish refugees from Poland who, following their refusal to accept Soviet citizenship, were deported in 1940 to Asia from the Soviet-occupied Polish territories. (A paradoxical result was that they were spared Nazi occupation.) An important reason for their refusal was the fear that after adopting Soviet citizenship they would never be able to rejoin their families, left behind under Nazi occupation, in Palestine or elsewhere overseas; the Soviet union does not, except rarely, permit emigration. In spite of their deportation, they are considered Soviet citizens. Their situation is now precarious, for social work in the Soviet Union, particularly in wartime, is not stressed. Similarly complicated is the problem of many Jews formerly living in the Soviet-incorporated areas of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Bukovina.

Naturally, there will be less of a desire to emigrate from Russia, if the present friendship between the U.S.S.R. and the democracies leads to a drastic change in the Soviet attitude towards religious tolerance and cultural contact with the rest of the world. Greater opportunities for Jewish religious survival, the elimination of restrictions against Hebrew and Zionism, and participation of the Soviet Jewish communities in Jewish post-war reconstruction throughout the world would tend to lessen the number of prospective emigrants from the U.S.S.R., as would also the opening of the gates of that country to the immigration of relatives. Emigration from the U.S.S.R. will, however, primarily depend on a change in policy. In the 1920's, the Soviet Union permitted the emigration of Jews to Palestine, under certain financial arrangements. Its anti-emigration policy has not always been uniform and may still be changed.

## 2. FORMER AND PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS

Unlike the average Jewish emigrant before the present war, the vast majority of the post-war emigrants will be completely destitute. Their appearance will be most unprepossessing. They will be ill clad. Their health is bound to be very bad in consequence of systematic and discriminatory undernourishment and medical neglect. Horror and insecurity will have undermined the mental health of many, and they will require treatment. Many will lack passports and other identifying documents. Others will be stateless. Large numbers will require occupational retraining.

The period of subsistence relief should be utilized to restore these people to physical and mental normality and to teach them new occupations and the languages of the countries of future immigration. Although many will not be in a condition to do so, they will want to emigrate at once and will be im-

patient of delay. They will prefer to leave in family groups whenever possible. This is contrary to the usual trend in emigration, where, as a rule, one member of a family prepares the way for the rest. On the other hand, there will be many unattached persons, particularly women and orphans.

### *b. In Search of Refuge*

There are a number of possible answers to the oft repeated question, "Where shall they go?" The answers depend on the kind of world established after the war, particularly on a change of attitude to immigration in overseas countries and as an improvement in the Palestine political situation. In addition to the repatriation of Jews from their present places of refuge or forced residence to their former homes or to centers of prospective emigration, we should distinguish between two types of migration, the internal and the overseas.

## I. INTERNAL MIGRATIONS

Over and above repatriation and the suggested exchange and transfer of populations as a means of solving minority problems, students predict many large-scale migrations within Europe and Asia. For instance, rather than repatriate some of the population that has been dislocated by war, or certain groups whose presence is not desired in places of strategic importance (e.g. the Volga Germans), and rather than have them remain where they are today, the Soviet Union may decide to ask for their transfer elsewhere or may settle them on its vast unoccupied Asiatic hinterland. The necessities of the war have already set in motion this vast internal migration within the Soviet Union, where many new communities have been built up in Asia. It is likely that this population shift will continue.

Drastic changes have also taken place in the geographical distribution of the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. Most of the Jews who were evacuated by the Soviet Government or who managed to escape the Nazi avalanche in 1941 found refuge in Asia, particularly Turkestan. It is likely that the government will have many of them remain there. Also, some Jews, along with others, may again be shifted elsewhere after the war. It is, further, possible that the Soviet Government may revive the Biro-Bidjan experiment. Finally, some Jews in Eastern Europe would prefer to join their relatives in the U.S.S.R. were the Soviet Government to relax its closed-door policy.

It is not unlikely that the rest of Europe will also witness internal migration. One migratory movement would consist of people moving from Eastern Europe to the Western and Central countries, as they did before the war. Then movements of seasonal labor and permanent emigrants from the overpopulated agrarian areas of Eastern Europe to the more prosperous countries of the West were common.\* The establishment of regional federations may also stimulate internal migrations from one area to another, in accordance with political and economic needs.

\*See Possibilities of Internal Migrations, by Robert Vacher, p. 68.

Jews too will also be affected by these internal migrations. Movements of East European Jews to Central and Western Europe have been taking place since the seventeenth century and have accelerated since 1914. In Unit IV we showed that much vitality was thus brought to the Jewish communities of the West.\* It is possible that the West and Central European countries may offer new homes to a limited number of skilled and specially trained Jews from Eastern Europe.

## 2. OVERSEAS MIGRATIONS

It is generally acknowledged, however, that internal migrations in Europe can at best provide for the needs of a relatively small number of the homeless and displaced. More attention therefore has been focused on mass emigration overseas, especially to the relatively underpopulated countries in the Western Hemisphere, Australia and Africa. In addition, many consider Palestine capable of absorbing a large number of immigrants.†

## 3. SUGGESTED HOMES BEFORE THE PRESENT WAR

Since the rise of Nazism over thirty proposals have been made for Jewish settlement in places all over the globe. Among them were irresponsible schemes such as the Lower California (Mexico) project, which only was utilized by Mexican fascists for anti-Semitic propaganda; and the Nai-Juda project, calling for the establishment of a Jewish state somewhere in Latin America. Madagascar was proposed by the anti-Semitic Polish Government as the place for a large number of Poland's "superfluous" Jewish population. The Nazis too have advertised Madagascar as a reservation for the Jews of Europe. Alaska has time and again been suggested as the answer to the needs of many refugees, Jewish and non-Jewish. Biro-Bidjan was thought to be suitable and receptive. In 1939, partly in an attempt to assuage Jewish opinion over the White Paper restrictions on immigration to Palestine, British Guiana in South America was offered for Jewish settlement by the British Government. Before the outbreak of the war, arrangements were made by the Refugee Economic Corporation for initiating a settlement in Mindanao, in the Philippines. In 1939, the Dominican Republic Settlement Association began the experiment of settling Jewish and non-Jewish refugees in a colony in Sosua, San Domingo. With the exception of the last-mentioned project, the results of which have been limited and inconclusive, none of these proposals has resulted in effective relief. In some cases, the governments concerned withdrew their offers; in others, investigation proved the unsuitability of the proposed place for European settlement. Another important cause for failure was the outbreak of the war.

### c. *Restrictionist Immigration Policies*

#### 1. THE RECORD

To judge by past experiences and the present attitudes of some governments, the outlook for post-war overseas migration is not bright. Some observers pre-

\*Unit IV, pp. 10-11.

†Unit VI, p. 13.

diet a repetition of the disappointing experiences which followed the First World War. Then, too, much hope was placed in emigration, but it was not realized. Instead, quota and other restrictive laws were passed by all the immigration-receiving countries. Moreover, in spite of the ever-mounting needs since the rise of Nazism, admission has frequently been much below the number of immigrants permitted to enter by law.\* For instance, while the present United States quota system provides for the annual entry of 153,774 immigrants, only 51,776 entered in the fiscal year 1940-41, and only 28,781 in 1941-42. Of the 453,205 immigrants who came here between 1933 and 1942, only 291,112 were from Europe and of these, in turn only 163,423 were Jews. While not the only country to follow this practice, it is the United States that sets the general tone in the Western hemisphere. In addition, the Evian Conference in 1938, and particularly the Bermuda Conference (April 1943), are cited as an indication that doors will probably remain closed after this war. (The problem of Palestine is of a different category.)

## 2. OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION

There are many causes for the prevailing opposition. Sometimes, the chief cause is hostility to the stranger or newcomer, whatever his origin. In other cases, objections are directed against particular groups of people. For instance, the quota laws of the United States give preference to immigrants from Northern, Central and Western Europe; discriminate against those from Eastern and Southeastern Europe; and completely exclude Chinese. Some Latin American countries prefer Spanish-speaking immigrants. In some countries where the influence of the Church is strong, Catholics have been given preference.

Economic motives play a large role in the restriction of immigration. In some Latin American countries merchants and professional people, fearing modernization and competition, have been instrumental in the passage of restrictive laws. Nor do objections stem wholly from conservative quarters. Although economists have time and again denied that immigrants are just so many consumers of food and competitors for jobs, this common prejudice stands in the way of opening gates to immigration. Organized labor in the United States, Australia and other countries has been among the most consistent opponents of immigration. Its opposition has been motivated by a fear that immigrants would narrow employment opportunities and lower working standards.

Frequently, opposition to immigration is maintained to the detriment of the national interest. For instance, the people of Australia, in spite of the dire need to increase its population as a precaution against an ever-threatening Japanese invasion, have resisted liberalizing their immigration provisions.

## 3. JEWS THE CHIEF VICTIMS OF THE CLOSED-DOOR POLICY

Even before Nazi propaganda began directly or indirectly to influence immigration policy abroad, restriction had had a particularly bad effect on

\*See *Refugee and Immigration Statistics*, by Ilja Dijour, p. 71.

Jews in Europe. For instance, the United States quota laws radically reduced the possibilities of emigration for the Jews of Poland and other countries long before Hitler came to power. The year 1933 marked a pronounced deterioration in Jewish migration prospects, while it simultaneously brought a great increase in migration needs. Anti-Semitic propaganda was directed from Germany toward the immigration-receiving countries; the refugees, being both Jews and immigrants, were doubly vulnerable. While it may be true that Jewish refugees would have been admitted more freely to some countries if they had been predominantly farmers, anti-Semitism, or fear that it would be injected into politics, was the major reason for increased restriction on immigration. Thus, general hostility to immigration, Nazi propaganda, the resulting threat of anti-Semitism, its appeasement by governments and democratic public opinion, general indifference to the plight of the Jews and, finally, the present war have brought about a situation in Europe today, in which that continent is a death trap for the Jews.

#### 4. INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF WORLD WAR I REFUGEES

Efforts to solve the problem of 'political' refugees undertaken by the League of Nations and other bodies following World War I clearly show that they then enjoyed greater consideration than now. Although the Covenant of the League did not include any provisions for the aid of refugees, the League set up machinery for helping them. The Office of the High Commissioner for Russian Refugees, established in 1921 with the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen as High Commissioner, helped greatly to solve the problems of the Russian refugees of all faiths and political opinions who had fled the Soviet regime. To aid the stateless, the so-called Nansen passport was adopted by fifty-two governments following an intergovernmental conference (July 1922). In 1924 this arrangement was extended to Armenian refugees from Turkey, over 100,000 of whom the Office helped to settle in Syria and Greece. With the financial aid of the League, the Nansen Office was likewise instrumental in carrying out the successful exchanges of populations between Turkey and Greece and between Bulgaria and Greece. For some time it also protected the Christian Assyrians persecuted by the Moslem Iraqis. Beginning with 1925 the refugee work was transferred to the Diplomatic Section of the International Labor Office (an organization affiliated with the League of Nations and composed of representatives of government, employers and labor of the various countries) as its Refugee Service. By 1929, because the refugee problem had been solved to a great extent and because of the desire of the various governments to liquidate the emergency services of the League, the Nansen International Office for Refugees was set up with the idea of terminating refugee work by the end of 1938.

#### 5. INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON BEHALF OF GERMAN REFUGEES

By 1933, however, there had arisen the new and pressing problem of German refugees. They were mostly Jewish. Because of objections by Germany (then still a member of the League of Nations) to any direct action by the League on behalf of the German Jews, the High Commission for Refugees

(Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany was created by the League as an autonomous organization. It was financed by private contributions and had James G. McDonald, an American, as its first High Commissioner. He resigned in 1935 after becoming convinced that the task was too great to be handled by a private organization, and was succeeded by Sir Neill Malcolm, an Englishman. Nevertheless, certain provisions, including one for providing refugees with identifying documents, helped to ease their plight somewhat. Attempts to have the League deal directly with the refugee problem continued, and in 1938 Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed the High Commissioner for Refugees under the Protection of the League of Nations. In July of the same year, thirty-two governments, called together by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a conference at Evian, France, established the Intergovernmental Refugee Committee, with George Rublee, an American, as its head. The Evian Conference recognized the need for a "long-range [refugee] program." Its participants thought that this could be achieved only with the "collaboration of the country of origin," viz., Nazi Germany, and that account should be taken of "the economic and social adaptability of immigrants." The only tangible offer in consequence of the Evian Conference was that of the Dominican Republic. Otherwise there has been no change for the better in the immigration policy of any of the participating countries.

In the meantime, however, the situation became more pressing by the expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany (October 1938), the November 1938 pogroms (following Herschel Grynszpan's assassination of the German embassy official, Ernst vom Rath, in Paris) and the promulgation of the White Paper on Palestine (May 17, 1939). In February 1939 the Rublee Plan was announced. It involved an agreement between Germany and the Intergovernmental Committee by which about 150,000 Jewish and "non-Aryan" refugees from Germany would emigrate in three to five years to overseas countries, where they were to be admitted within the existing immigration laws. Their emigration was to be financed by money expropriated from German Jews, and no flight or other tax was to be levied on them. Elderly and sick Jews were to be permitted to remain in Germany without interference or "ghettoizing," unless "something extraordinary occurs such as another attempt upon the life of a Nazi leader by a Jew." The Coordinating Foundation, an Anglo-American organization founded in London, August 1, 1939, to facilitate the orderly settlement of refugees, as contemplated by the Rublee Plan, was unable to function because of the outbreak of the war. The Bermuda Conference, (April 1943) is the latest intergovernmental attempt to help refugees.\*

## Part I

### 9. POSITIVE FACTORS OPERATING IN FAVOR OF CHANGE IN IMMIGRATION POLICY

We see therefore that the record of international action on behalf of the Jewish victims of Nazism is not impressive. Advocates and planners of

\*See p. 12.

overseas migrations, however, believe that following the present war attitudes towards immigration will be liberalized. The increasing unity between the United Nations, they feel, which is bound to result in lasting international cooperation in the political and economic fields, will bring to the fore the importance of migration both in the reconstruction of Europe and in the development of overseas countries. They therefore call the attention of statesmen and the public to the basic problems of some countries, which, they claim, can be solved only through mass *immigration*; and to the basic problems of others, which can be solved only through mass *emigration*.\*

### a. *World Needs of Migration*

Advocates of migration hold that no progress is possible without free movements of populations. Human history, they point out, is largely a history of migration movements. The American continent and Soviet Asia, both now teeming with millions of people, could not have been developed without masses of immigrants from the more crowded areas in Europe. Immigrants have not only raised the standards of living and civilization in their new homes, but by draining the excess populations from their former homes they have also helped to make conditions better there. Overcrowding in certain areas creates not only economic but also political tensions, and underpopulated areas, besides suffering retrogression or, at best, stagnation, are apt to tempt aggressive countries. While the need for international economic cooperation has been asserted time and again by leading thinkers and statesmen, not enough emphasis has been placed on the advisability and need of redistributing the most dynamic factor in economics—human labor. The increased demand in the post-war world for raw materials and foodstuffs from the underpopulated regions will require adequate manpower to cope with the higher needs of production. Related fields, such as transportation and manufacturing, will also require additional labor and managerial and clerical personnel. The domestic consumer market of backward and underpopulated countries will be strengthened by the addition of many new immigrant consumers. In primitive countries, the presence of a new labor force, alert and skilled, will tend to eliminate the evils of unbridled exploitation. A world built on international cooperation has to be based on high standards of living everywhere. Development of underdeveloped areas is essential. This cannot be achieved without immigration.

Prosperity and security, advocates of migration hold, are therefore directly connected with the increase of population, which in advanced countries can no longer depend on accretions by birth.

Without immigration, for instance, the population of the United States, counting 131,669,275 in 1940, will reach a maximum of 136,500,000 by 1956. After this, because of the declining birth rate, it will begin to fall rapidly, reaching 126,500,000 by 1980. On the other hand, if immigration were open to only 300,000 annually, a number which can be absorbed without any difficulty at all, the population would by 1980 reach 202,000,000.

But not all students are convinced that large populations are, *ipso facto*, good. Those who concede the probability of a declining birthrate point out

\*See *Jewish Migrations, Past Experiences and Post-War Prospects*, by Eugene M. Kulischer. Pamphlet Series, *Jesus and the Post-War World*, Number 4, New York: Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of the American Jewish Committee, 1943.

that, especially since the Industrial Revolution, maxima in population numbers have not at all necessarily been compatible with maxima in population welfare. As between numbers and decent standards of life, they opt for decent standards. They recall that several nations which have in the recent past pursued a populationist policy were motivated by aggressive and imperialist ambitions and were primarily desirous of increasing productive and military manpower and of rationalizing their aggressions by the plea of irresistible population pressures. Populationist policies were launched despite low national standards of living, and resulted in a further decrease in standard. Moreover, they say, even from the point of view of military security, a high degree of industrial and agricultural efficiency is more important than numbers, other things being equal. In their view the future, in both industry and agriculture, will give increasing weight to the factor of efficiency and modernization, as against manpower quantities.

## 1. UNDERPOPULATED COUNTRIES

Population overcrowding and density are relative terms, depending greatly on the development of a given area. Thus, in highly industrialized England and Wales 695 inhabitants lived per square mile in 1932, in contrast to 155 in agrarian Ireland. While 184 persons occupied one square mile in Europe (excluding the U.S.S.R.), there were only 41 (in 1942, 44.2) persons living in the same area in the U.S.A. Canada and Australia had the extremely low average of 7.7 and 3.8 persons per habitable mile respectively. Thus we can see that the term "underpopulated" is elastic. On the basis of American population density, Australia's population would be over 45,000,000, but on the basis of population density in the Western U.S.A. Australia would have a population of 29,603,000.

Similarly underpopulated are a number of countries in Latin America. Brazil, for instance, with an area of 3,275,510 square miles, has a population of 41,356,605, thus showing a population density of 12.6 per square mile. Argentina, with an area of 1,078,278 square miles and a population of 13,518,239, had a population density of 12.5. Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia and Paraguay, although countries of varying economies and standards of living, have in common the probability that they would benefit greatly from immigration. The adherents of migration as a solution base their arguments on the economic and political needs of such countries, rather than on sentimental and humanitarian reasons alone.

## 2. SPECIAL AREAS OF POSSIBLE GROUP SETTLEMENT

The most important areas suggested for Jewish mass settlement are Argentina, Biro-Bidjan, Brazil, Canada and the Kimberleys in Australia. At various times since the beginning of the century, but especially since the Evian Conference in 1938, there have also been suggestions that settlements should be made in British Guiana, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Alaska, in the Western Hemisphere; and Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Uganda, Angola and Madagascar, in Africa.

Most experts are inclined to favor the first series of settlement areas and to consider Biro-Bidjan and the Kimberleys the most hopeful today. Biro-

Bidjan in Soviet Siberia, comprising over 15,000 square miles, was set aside for Jewish settlement in 1928 and was proclaimed an autonomous region in 1934. While it is estimated that only about 20,000 Jews are living there today, Biro-Bidjan may be opened to post-war Jewish immigration. A plan for settling large masses of Jews in the Australian Kimberleys region, consisting of some 11,000 square miles, with a population of about 460,000, is sponsored by the Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Settlement. Today there is evidence of rising Australian official and public opinion in favor of the project.

Of the other countries in the "important" category, there was a substantial planned rural settlement of Jews in Argentina toward the end of the last century. As far as the future is concerned, however, no specific plans have as yet been proposed or materially considered for any of them.

Though agricultural colonization of Jews in Brazil has taken place on a very small scale, the success of Japanese colonies in Brazil points to the possibilities of large-scale settlement after the war, for Brazil contains an enormous area of undeveloped land of great fertility.

British Guiana, with an area of 89,480 square miles and a population in 1932 of more than 300,000, over two-thirds being Negro and East Indian, was offered in 1939 by the British Government for Jewish settlement. Experts tend to be doubtful of Guiana's suitability for white settlement. Furthermore, the East Indians and the Negroes in the British West Indies have objected to Jewish settlement, protesting that their own landless should receive priority in colonization and land distribution. No actual settlement of Jews has taken place.

The Government of Ecuador in 1935 made a generous offer of some 1600 square miles of land to a French refugee settlement organization. A delegation of experts approved the plan in 1936. Jewish organizations in the field, however, felt that the proposed area was located far from available communications, involving great expenditures, and that the very high altitude of some regions and the tropical location of others made it largely, if not entirely, unsuitable for white settlement.

Alaska, with an area of over 590,000 square miles, had a population of 72,524 in 1939 and is considered capable of supporting a population of 12,000,000. Efforts to turn this territory into a haven for refugees have been headed by United States Secretary of the Interior Harold I. Ickes. A proposal before the Congress in 1940 to open it to refugee settlement was shelved because of general objections against immigration and the opposition of Alaskan public opinion.

Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Uganda, while having plenty of rich soil, seem to be closed to mass immigration in view of the rapid increase of the native populations, and the objections of the local white populations. Angola in West Africa was offered for Jewish settlement by the Portuguese in 1911. Subsequently, however, the Portuguese Government declared its unwillingness to permit Jewish mass settlement. Madagascar, as we have seen, was intended by the Nazis to be the center of Jewish concentration. It has been found unfit for white settlement.

The large majority of the proposed areas are located in tropical and subtropical regions. There are many objections to white settlement in tropical regions, most of them based on reasons of health. The fact that all these tropical and subtropical regions (except Australia) are surrounded by rapidly increasing native and colored populations, whose natural area of expansion would thus be blocked by Jewish settlement, would create many problems of intergroup relations. Some Jewish groups are opposed to mixed settlement because of the possibility of the eventual loss of the settlers' Jewish identity through intermarriage.

### 3. PALESTINE

Many Zionists say that further distribution of Jews, rather than their concentration, would tend to spread anti-Semitism. They insist on the priority of Palestine in any consideration of mass settlement, and tend to view territorial and other settlement proposals with suspicion, feeling that these are often utilized to detract from the importance of Palestine.\*

There can be little doubt that if the White Paper of 1939, with its absolute restriction on further Jewish immigration after 1944, continues in effect, Jewish emigration from Europe will be gravely prejudiced. A major immigration-receiving outlet will disappear, with a resultant increase in the number striving for entrance elsewhere, at a time when even those who do not prefer to go to Palestine may encounter serious difficulty in obtaining entrance into other countries.

#### *b. Individual vs. Group Migrations*

While the earliest colonization of the Western Hemisphere and other new areas was largely achieved through group immigration (as for instance, the Pilgrim Fathers, the mass import of Negro slaves, the original convict settlement of Australia) individual migration has been the more important method. An individual would set out to find a new home. He would send for his closest relatives following his adjustment to new conditions. These would be followed by other people living in the home community. While this movement, seen totally, is one of mass migration, it should not be confused with group migration. The latter type of migration takes place when a group of prospective immigrants organizes itself or is formed by a government body or a colonization society with the purpose of establishing new communities or settlements in areas selected before departure. An example of successful group migrations among Jews is that of the movement to Argentina in the 1890's and that of the Halutzim (trained pioneers) to Palestine.

Group settlement requires much advance planning and preparation on the part of the governmental or private agencies concerned. In contrast, individual migration leaves much more to the initiative of the individual as well as to his relatives and sponsors. The story of Jewish migration overseas in the period between the two wars shows many examples of the 'discovery' of new homes by enterprising individuals who laid the foundation for the absorption of many newcomers later directed there by relief and migration bodies. Included in this category are Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, countries where there were very few Jews before World War I. Similarly,

\*Compare Unit VI.

following the rise of Nazism, enterprising individuals discovered new opportunities for themselves and a limited number of specially qualified people in out-of-the-way places, like Java, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines. While some immigrant-receiving countries, like the United States, offer better opportunities to individual immigrants, students of migration claim that more could be achieved by the method of group migration, especially in the under-populated subtropical and tropical areas. Of course, skilled people, professional and artisan, will find their place in both group and individual migration movements. It is felt, however, that the less skilled people, such as prospective farmers, could be accommodated more adequately on a group basis, especially in certain areas which are considered available or suitable for mass settlement.

### 1. THE ECONOMY OF THE SETTLEMENTS

For both individual and group settlements there is a further choice with respect to the character of their economy. Shall ownership be individual, on the one hand, or cooperative and collective on the other? Or shall a compromise prevail? A study of the varieties of settlement economy in Argentina and Palestine, adopted as objective conditions and personal preference dictates, will prove of great value to future settlers. There are also those who advocate mixed group settlements which combine agricultural and industrial enterprises.

### 2. TWO TYPES OF JEWISH MASS SETTLEMENT

Projects for Jewish mass settlement can be classified in two categories: the territorialist and the philanthropic. Territorialists base their view on the post-war needs of millions of dispossessed Jews as well as on the needs of Jewish group survival. In both these respects the territorialist point of view is very similar to that of the Zionists, except for the territorialist contention that Palestine is unable to solve the problem of homes for millions because of what they consider its limited absorptive capacity and because of political reasons. The philanthropic advocates of settlement are concerned primarily with the humanitarian motive of helping dispossessed Jews. Territorialists, as a rule, advocate close Jewish settlement with some degree of cultural (Yiddish) autonomy; the maximalists among them are in favor of a Jewish state or a political autonomous region with Yiddish as its official language. The philanthropists do not as a rule insist on exclusively Jewish colonization, some preferring settlements on a non-sectarian basis (e.g. Sosua). Similarly they do not contemplate cultural autonomy, preferring the type of Jewish communal organization and allegiance established in the western democracies.

### 3. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN RESETTLEMENT

In contrast to the situation before the present war, when most of the refugees in search of resettlement were from Germany and had some capital, it is clear that even if reparations are made on a large scale, the majority of the surviving Jews in Eastern Europe will be penniless. The problem of financing overseas settlements (granted that the proper areas are made available) involving as it does occupational retraining, shipping, preparation of the soil, roads, communications and other public utilities, homes, seed, and grants to settlers until they

become self-sufficient, is bound to be enormous. The costs of settlement rise continually as the available areas tend to be located further away from centers of communication and urban areas, and the soil allotted requires much more preparation, such as water supply and the clearing of forests. The average potential Jewish settler is not a very experienced farmer, and the costly trial and error involved raise additional problems of expenditure. It is therefore generally agreed that, as with the financing of relief, so the raising of the enormous funds required for settlement is beyond the capacity of private organizations and even individual governments. Large-scale financial assistance cannot be obtained from the countries of immigration, particularly the Latin American. It appears therefore that only an international and intergovernmental financing body is capable of taking care of the financial costs involved in resettlement, on the basis of loans, outright grants or both.

#### 4. ORGANIZATION OF POST-WAR MIGRATION

In the wider sense, however, settlement is but a part of the larger movement of migration. In view of the great needs and complexities of the problem, particularly the chaotic conditions which will prevail in Europe following the end of hostilities, it is the conviction of most that all types of migration, internal, individual and mass, will have to be coordinated and managed scientifically.

In addition to the problem of obtaining outlets for migration, one sufficiently complex to challenge the imagination of the thinker and diplomat and the assiduousness of the scholar, there are the weighty tasks of preparing temporary shelters for the future immigrant, salvaging whatever reparations may be made available for him, aiding him to sell his property, providing opportunities for proper vocational retraining, securing the proper passports and visas, protecting him before prejudiced officials, perhaps with the aid of case workers attached to consular offices, providing shipping facilities, and looking out for exploiters and imposters in the ports of embarkation and arrival, ever on the alert to deprive the poor immigrant of his possessions. It is clear, therefore, that besides the large tasks of regulating and financing migration and settlement, to be achieved by intergovernmental agencies, there also remain a number of vital tasks for the initiative of the private relief and social work agencies.

### Part J

#### 10. WHO WILL DO THE WORK?

##### a. General Organizations

It is expected that the major tasks of financing and feeding will probably be entrusted to governmental and intergovernmental agencies such as the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (The Lehman Committee), the Leith-Ross Commission in England and the AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories). A more inclusive United

Nations agency is believed likely to be created. The role of the International Red Cross is not to be overlooked.

### *b. Jewish Organizations and Personnel*

Foremost in the field of Jewish relief and reconstruction is the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Established in 1914 as a fund-distributing agency, the J.D.C., following World War I, engaged immediately in relief and health work, and later in reconstruction, mainly through subsidizing national and local agencies in the countries in which it operated. The J.D.C. also financed migration work after the rise of Nazism to power.

The Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA), together with a J.D.C. subsidiary, the Agro-Joint, and the American-Joint Reconstruction Foundation, have much experience in settlement and colonization; all have worked in the U.S.S.R., and the ICA has also been active in Palestine and Argentina especially. The Refugee Economic Corporation has done some work in countries other than those mentioned above.

The outstanding organization in the field of migrations is the Hias-Ica Emigration Association (HICEM), established in 1927 by the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society of America (HIAS) and the ICA. The purpose of the HICEM is to regulate migration of Jews throughout the world.

Various Palestinian agencies have also acquired appropriate skills and experience. The Jewish Agency for Palestine has supervised Jewish immigration and settlement; Hechalutz (established in 1921) has engaged in agricultural and industrial training for future immigrants; the Youth Aliyah (Heb., immigration) movement, sponsored in the U.S.A. by Hadassah, is primarily concerned with child care. The Histadrut (General Federation of Jewish Labor) and the various collectives have also done much colonization work.

The ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation through Training; originally Obshchestvo Razprostrannenya Truda . . . [Society for the Spreading of Labor among Jews]), established in 1880, has been engaged in occupational training in Eastern Europe. The OSE (Organizatsia Sanitaria Eugenica), established in 1912, and its Polish sister organization the TOZ (Towarzystwo Ochrony Zdrowia) have been engaged in health work. The thousands of *landsmanshaften* (societies of people from the same localities) and their central organizations are also preparing to do their share in relief and reconstruction in specific communities. We do not here list local agencies.

How much of the personnel engaged in Jewish relief and reconstruction will be of local origin, and how much from the Jewish communities outside, is difficult to predict. Much will depend on the availability of foreign Jewish personnel; here the question of adequate specialized social-work training is important. Perhaps more important will be the attitude of the occupying authorities, at least during the immediately post-war period. In North Africa the military authorities have approved the entrance of two J.D.C. representatives who are cooperating very closely with and working under the auspices

of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. This organization has on its staff some experts in the Jewish field, but no representatives of Jewish organizations in an official capacity. It cooperates with Jewish relief organizations which have been established in North Africa for some time.

The problem of coordinating the work of all the Jewish agencies that will be in the field, and relating it to general relief, reconstruction and migration, is highly technical. Moreover, it involves touchy areas of community and organizational relationships.

To provide the necessary financial support will be a great and challenging task.\* The American Jewish community, free, great and wealthy, will certainly try to discharge its responsibilities. But those responsibilities will not end with financial contributions, however great. The Jews of the United States and the other free countries will be called upon to give of their utmost in devotion and intelligence.

\*See Estimate of Finances Required for Jewish Relief, by A. Menes, p. 74.

# *Selected Readings*

## 1. COMPARISON OF BEVERIDGE REPORT AND NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD REPORT\*

### BEVERIDGE REPORT

### N.R.P.B. REPORT

#### What Are the Objectives of the Plans?

To ensure freedom from want, the opportunity to work, and the promotion of the health of the people.

To ensure freedom from want, the opportunity to work, and the promotion of the health of the people.

#### How Specific Are the Recommendations?

No programs for work assurance.

Specific programs for public assurance of work.

No youth programs.

Specific programs for youth.

Specific programs for income.

Specific programs for income.

Maintenance.

Maintenance.

General recommendations for health.

General recommendations for health.

#### What Risks Are Provided For?

Old age.

Old age.

Unemployment.

Unemployment.

Temporary and permanent disability.

Temporary and permanent disability.

Loss of breadwinner.

Loss of breadwinner.

Special costs of childbearing.

Costs of rearing children.

Funeral expenses.

#### Who Will Be Protected?

Everyone.

Everyone.

#### How Is Security To Be Provided?

A two-fold program:

A three-fold program:

Social insurance benefits.

General public assistance.

Work for employables.

Social insurance benefits.

Special and general public assistance.

#### Who Will Be Protected Through Work Programs?

Not provided for (no work programs).

All unemployed youth under 21 and all workers who have been unemployed 26 weeks or more or who are not entitled to unemployment insurance.

#### Who Will Be Protected Through Social Insurance?

All of the population except:

(A) Ultimately all wage earners now covered plus employees in agriculture and domestic service, except persons who have not earned the minimum qualifying sum in covered employment, or who are disqualified by failure to comply with other requirements.

(B) Persons exempted because receiving income of less than £75 a year.

(B) Speed of extension to agriculture and domestic workers to depend upon changes in benefit formulas and earnings requirements.

(B) Persons who have not paid the minimum number of insurance contributions or who are disqualified by failure to comply with other requirements.

#### Who Will Be Protected Through Public Assistance?

(A) Ultimately:

(A) Ultimately:

1. All persons whose insurance benefits are inadequate for their needs and require supplementation.

1. All persons whose insurance benefits are inadequate for their needs and require supplementation.

## BEVERIDGE REPORT (cont.)

2. All persons who have not paid the minimum number of contributions to be eligible for insurance.
  3. All persons disqualified from insurance, e.g., they have refused suitable work.
  4. All persons exempted because having incomes of less than £75 a year.
- (B) For the next 20 years: There will be in addition, a large proportion of all aged persons who will receive pensions at less than the full rate, and require supplementation.

## What Kind of Insurance Benefits Will be Paid?

Uniform benefits based on the cost of maintenance for all (including dependents) except:

- (A) Lower benefits for the aged for the next 20 years.
  - (B) Benefits based on past earnings for workers permanently disabled by occupational disease or injury.
  - (C) Deductions for earnings are made from payments to widows and aged.
- Geographical and occupational variations in benefits may be introduced later.

## What Kind of Public Assistance Allowances Will Be Made?

Allowances will vary from case to case depending on the needs and resources of the applicant.

## N.R.P.B. REPORT (cont.)

2. All persons who have not earned the minimum qualifying sum in covered employment, and the self-employed.
3. All persons disqualified from insurance, e.g., they have refused suitable work.

(B) For the immediate future: There will be in addition, workers in agriculture and domestic service.

## What Kind of Insurance Benefits Will be Paid?

Benefits based on the past earnings with minimum payments and additions and dependents.

## How Is the Security Program to Be Financed?

- (A) Social insurance programs to be paid for by taxes on employers and workers with a contribution from national tax funds.
- (B) Public assistance and children's allowances to be paid from national tax funds.

(A) Social insurance programs to be paid for by taxes on employers and workers with a contribution from national tax funds.

(B) Public assistance programs (both special and general) to be paid for from general tax funds, Federal, State and local.

(C) Work programs to be paid for from Federal tax funds with contributions from State and local sponsors.

## How Will the Costs of Social Security Affect the Average Citizen?

- (A) All adults of working age whether gainfully employed or not (except non-gainfully employed married women and persons earning less than £75 a year) and all employers will pay a single tax for all insurable risks. The amount of the tax is not related to the earnings but depends upon the benefits to be received and the sex and age of the insured person. There are 18 classes of contributions.
- (B) Employees in extra hazardous industries will pay a special levy.
- (C) All citizens will contribute as general taxpayers.

(A) All workers in insurable employments and their employers will pay a tax whose amount will depend on wages received.

\*From U.S. National Resources Planning Board, *Comparison of the National Resources Planning Board's "Security, Work, and Relief Policies" and the Beveridge Report*, 7p., mimeo., 1943.

—*Bulletin to Study the Organization of Peace*, May-June 1943, pp. 23-24.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

The social aims of the United Nations were simply stated by Ambassador Winant in his speech of June 6, 1942: "What we want is not complicated. We have enough technical knowledge and organizing ability to respond to this awakening of social conscience. We have enough courage. We must put it to use. When war is done, the drive for tanks must become a drive for houses. The drive for food to prevent the enemy from starving us must become a drive for food to satisfy the needs of all people in all countries. The drive for physical fitness in the forces must become a drive for bringing death and sickness rates in the whole population down to the lowest possible level. The drive for manpower in war must become a drive for employment to make freedom from want a living reality. The drive for an all-out war effort by the United Nations must become a drive for an all-out peace effort, based on the same cooperation and willingness to sacrifice."

At an appropriate period, the emergency tasks of relief and rehabilitation and of the redistribution of refugees must be merged in a permanent world organization for social welfare—or what Sun Yat Sen in his great book on the Three Principles, calls "Livelihood." The freedom from want, like the freedom from fear, should be organized not only on a national, but also on an international basis. Basic minimum standards for sanitation, for medical care, for housing, for nutrition, for social security, must be definitely visualized—and at least approached—for all peoples if a stable world order is to be maintained. The United Nations do not, of course, propose to provide charitable upkeep for all persons. Food, or other gifts, is not the answer even for temporary relief. The purpose must be to aid human beings, now rendered helpless by economic interdependence and endangered by war, to help themselves. To do this, the system must be one within which individual effort is, on the one hand, required, and, on the other hand, assured of reward. No one nation, under the changed conditions of today, can give this assurance to its citizens; it is an international problem as well as a domestic problem.

To achieve these aims so much emphasized by the United Nations, every possible agency should be utilized. Success will depend largely upon the willingness of national governments to lead the way.

An outstanding example of such national effort is the Beveridge Report in Great Britain. The acclaim given to it among the United Nations, and the angry efforts of Nazi propaganda to disparage it, reveal the importance of such efforts not only as offering hope for the future but even as part of war strategy.

Certain things are already being done during the war which recognize the necessity of social improvement and the fact that a fundamental birthright of physical and emotional and social health for all persons, rich or poor, is a basic cornerstone of the democratic ideal. The rationing system in England has leveled the opportunities to secure food and has given to poor people more nutritious food than they have ever had before. The establishment of an office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations anticipates social rebuilding to extend far beyond the war period. Many agreements made between the United States and South American countries now contain provisions for social improvement. Among these are agreements as to health and sanitation in rubber production areas, and provisions for nutrition and food resources. In contracts for work to be done in South American countries an international "fair wages clause" has been introduced by the United States. From such experimentation and advance, experience and techniques are acquired which will be of use in the future.

The same social standards cannot be expected from all nations; and in many areas progress must necessarily be slow. International leadership and assistance will be needed. The International Labor Organization has exerted a constant pressure for the improvement of standards in the field of labor and social security. Its Office has served as a center of information and counsel to governments. An international public opinion on the raising of the standard of life has been developed in the annual Labor Conferences, which bring together representatives of governments, industry, and labor. The conventions adopted at these gatherings set minimum standards which have won a considerable measure of ratification and legal enforcement in the member countries. Its 1941 Conference helped to crystallize the social and economic aims of the free peoples. In the postwar world the work of standard-setting must be taken up on a broader basis. It should be closely integrated with general economic policy and

with measures for the development of backward areas and for improving the status of what have been the dependent peoples of the world. One essential in a program of social reconstruction is, therefore, to strengthen the International Labor Organization, and to link it more closely with the agencies of the United Nations. Every possible use should be made of it to draw associations of labor and of employers into full participation in the tasks of world organization. Certain League of Nations organs, such as the Advisory Committee on Social Questions, or the Opium Advisory Committee, have had experience in this field, and they should be included in, or related to, the work of the United Nations. The need is for a system of related agencies for social reconstruction, linked on the one hand with economic agencies, and on the other hand with health and relief agencies.

It is essential that international programs should be developed for wise and gradual evolution of better health conditions everywhere throughout the world. This requires a central planning body, which can serve as a clearing house for the best scientific knowledge of all nations, a capacity in which the Health Organization of the League of Nations has functioned admirably in the past. Something more than interchange of information and development of master plans for social welfare will, however, be required. To serve many areas of the world intellectual leadership must be supplemented by an international system of grants-in-aid such as operate on a national basis in the United States and have been represented on a world-wide scale by the beneficence of the Rockefeller Foundation. A program for grants-in-aid—either on a national or an international basis—is in the nature of a temporary stop-gap. The word "temporary" must indeed be interpreted in terms of decades; but subsidy as between one area and another, one nation and another, as a permanent arrangement cannot be consonant with self-respect. Our ideal must be ultimate economic as well as political independence. Where a given nation is now on an economic level too low for the provision of the basic necessities of life, the most important service which can be rendered to that nation is to make an intensive study of its resources in manpower and materials and to try to devise a program of national self-support on a level consonant with democratic opportunity. Sometimes the best contributions we can make to the health or the housing of an area would be to build a railroad

or to remove inhibiting economic barriers to trade.

### Economic Reconstruction

Social reconstruction and economic reconstruction are closely connected. The Atlantic Charter asks for "improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security"; and it asks these "for all." The United Nations seek, more broadly, assurance "that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." President Roosevelt, at the 1941 International Labor Organization Conference, said that economic policy is "a means for achieving social objectives."

While the present commitments of the United Nations unequivocally support economic international cooperation, they leave States free to choose their own economic way of life. Indeed, the implications of the Atlantic Charter are such that only through international cooperation can a nation preserve its own economic way of life. It is very important that those who are thinking of reconstruction in the domestic field should realize the extent to which the success of their plans depends upon the international economic cooperation of business and labor.

During the last century and a half, great changes have taken place in our habits of life, and nations have not yet adjusted themselves to the irresistible pressures which have been, and are at work in the world. The impact of economic interdependence has caught the individual in a system in which he cannot, alone, be assured even of livelihood; the impact of war has likewise deprived him of any feeling of physical security. This plight of the individual must be recognized; only an international solution can relieve him of the economic insecurity arising from international interdependence and of the physical insecurity arising from war which has become global and all-pervading. The State is no longer capable, alone, of assuring the welfare of its citizens. Economic nationalism has proved insufficient, in an interdependent world, to meet the needs of those who in the past have relied upon it.

To enable States to relieve the insecurity and discontent of their people, and to achieve the social purposes of the Atlantic Charter, three essentials may be laid down in the international economic field. There must be "access to markets." Political boundaries should not be economic bar-

riers; they must be permeable to trade. But merely dropping the bars will not promote a healthy flow of trade; there must be positive action as well. Economic stability is the second requirement, and this means national and international measures to combat booms and depressions and unemployment. Finally, there must be a purposeful, progressive, economic development. Article VII of the master agreements under the Lend-Lease system is a pledge of such positive development. "Full blast production for a gradually rising standard of living" said Milo Perkins, in an address of May 25, 1942, "will be as necessary to win the peace as all-out production now is to win the war." An expanding economy will make adjustments, including those of demobilization and reconstruction after the war, easier.

The "collaboration" of which the Atlantic Charter speaks will necessarily mean administrative institutions and regulations, with power behind them; and to secure this collaboration in the economic field will probably be the most difficult task in the rebuilding of order in the world. It will be difficult because small groups affected by proposed changes will combine their pressure upon their own governments to prevent any change which, though a gain to their nation as a whole, appears to them to mean loss for their own groups. These groups will bitterly oppose modification of such restrictive acts as the Smoot-Hawley tariff or the Ottawa agreements. The economic changes required may indeed mean temporary loss for some groups, but they will mean rescue for many, and in the long run, gain for all. Groups which anticipate loss through such change should consider the needs of human beings everywhere, and seek compensation where they can show losses, rather than attempt to block necessary international arrangements. Nor should peoples, or legislative bodies, permit small and selfishly interested groups or prevent needed change. As Under Secretary of State Welles said, in his Memorial Day address: "The destruction of international trade by special minority interests in this and other countries brought ruin to their fellow-citizens. . . . Can the democracies of the world again afford to permit national policies to be dictated by self-seeking minorities of special privilege?" The cost of ridding the world of economic warfare is little, compared with the cost, in depression and unemployment and actual war, of continuing it.

Advance toward a better world econ-

omy will depend upon the willingness of the great industrial powers, and particularly of the United States, to take the lead and set the example; and the prerequisite to all advance is agreement between the British Commonwealth and the United States, whose economic power and influence will be so great that nothing can be done until they first reach agreement. Some evidences of such agreement are to be found in the words of various statesmen of the United Nations, in the terms of the Atlantic Charter and, in a very practical sense, in the seventh clause of the master agreements made under the Lend-Lease Act. It is important to note that Lend-Lease aid is a two-way system, in which the United States receives as well as gives. Doubtless the exigencies of common action will produce other such practices, and the transference from older methods to freer trade may be a continuing and gradual process.

#### *Economic and Social Agencies*

If agreement upon economic principles and policy can be obtained, a number of organizations will be needed, some of which may well develop from existent or war agencies. Suggestions deserving of serious study have been made with reference to a number of these. The Relief and Rehabilitation Authority above suggested would have economic functions. In view of the wide reach of reconstruction tasks, the suggestion has been made that there should be a United Nations shipping administration and effective organization, on business lines, for controlling transit or power in various areas. A monetary organization is needed to keep exchange stable—a United Nations Monetary Authority—which might enable the several billions of gold from the vaults in Kentucky to acquire usefulness once again. A Commodity Corporation could coordinate purchases, accumulate materials and direct their use both for war purposes and for reconstruction purposes following the war. Such an agency could absorb world surpluses and release them when occasion favored or need required.

Based upon the experience of the Export-Import Bank, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and their counterparts in other countries, a United Nations Development Authority might be set up, working through regional authorities, to deal with economic development and the investment connected therewith. Their work could have much influence upon

domestic inflation and unemployment. It is very important that those engaged in working out domestic recovery policies should realize the extent to which the success of their plans depends upon international economic success. Governments have today, both as a matter of public policy and for war purposes, much greater control over and share in business enterprises than after World War I, and the question therefore arises as to the extent and the method of participation of private enterprise and capital. There are many proposals for international public works for which the Canadian-American highway to Alaska and the canalizing of the Rio Grande by the International Boundary Commission of the United States and Mexico furnish precedents. Feasible projects adapted to the concept of regional development authorities include the control and development of river systems which offer great opportunities for conservation and maximum use of natural resources, as well as furnishing widespread industrial and community benefits on a self-liquidating basis.

Industry must be rebuilt or expanded, and in many countries, such as China, the people and the government are actively and farsightedly planning toward this end. They will need the aid of foreign experts,

and training for their own national experts; financial aid will be required, and international guarantees therefor. In such necessary reconstruction, there will be opportunities for selling goods, for employment, and for investment; but there is wide agreement that the process of international investment should no longer be left uncontrolled in private hands, to lead to inflation and depression as it did after the first World War. The proposed United Nations Development Authority should have such a governing body as would carry assurance of good faith both to the nations in which the capital would be raised and to the nations in which it would be spent, to approve projects and to authorize loans, private or international. Loans mean development; and development such as we need after the war and in such opportunities as will then exist, cannot be left entirely to private investors. But in planning for the permanent world order under the régime of freedom, private enterprise must, as indicated above, continue to play a major part.

---

—Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. "Third Report—The United Nations and the Organization of Peace," *International Conciliation*, No. 389, April 1943, pp. 223-229.

### 3. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

#### *Declaration of Principles*

This conference, meeting in the midst of the greatest war ever waged and in full confidence of victory, has considered the world problems of food and agriculture and declares its belief that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and adequate for the health and strength of all peoples can be achieved.

1. The first task is to complete the winning of the war and to deliver millions of people from tyranny and from hunger. During the period of critical shortage in the aftermath of war freedom from hunger can be achieved only by urgent and concerted efforts to economize consumption, to increase supplies and to distribute them to best advantage.

2. Thereafter we must equally concert our efforts to win and maintain freedom from fear and freedom from want. The

one cannot be achieved without the other.

3. There has never been enough food for the health of all people. This is justified neither by ignorance nor by the harshness of nature. Production of food must be greatly expanded; we now have knowledge of the means by which this can be done. It requires imagination and firm will on the part of each government and people to make use of that knowledge.

4. The first cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty. It is useless to produce more food unless men and nations provide the markets to absorb it. There must be an expansion of the whole world economy to provide purchasing power sufficient to maintain an adequate diet for all. With full employment in all countries, enlarged industrial production, the

absence of exploitation, the increasing flow of trade within and between countries, the orderly management of domestic and international investment and currencies, and sustained internal and international economic equilibrium, the food which is produced can be made available to all people.

3. The primary responsibility lies with each nation for seeing that its own people have the food needed for health and life; steps to this end are for national determination. But each nation can fully achieve its goal only if all work together.

6. We commend to our respective gov-

ernments the study and adoption of the findings and recommendations of the conference and urge the early concerted discussion of the related problems falling outside of the scope of this conference.

7. The first steps toward freedom from want of food must not await the final solution of all other problems. Each advance made in one field will strengthen and quicken an advance in all others. Work already begun must be continued. Once the war has been won decisive steps can be taken. We must make ready now.

—*New York Times*, June 2, 1943.

#### 4. THE POSTWAR EUROPEAN ECONOMY

##### *Economic Unity*

As we have seen, Hitler has forced a degree of economic unity on Europe. The operating controls of German war industry (with which all European industry is linked) rest in the hands of only a few hundred German bureaucrats and businessmen. The removal of these individuals would place the economic machinery of Europe at Allied disposal. Is this ready-made centralization an asset or a liability to the prosperity of a Europe at peace?

On the whole, it is probably a liability. Some logical new trade channels have been developed, but their main purpose is to supply the German war machine, and they may or may not be equally logical for a European consumer economy. The efficiency of Nazi industrial organization has in any case been greatly overrated. Moreover, many of the war-forged links between German and non-German industry represent stolen property that must be restored. About all the European Council should retain of Nazi Europe is the practice of viewing the European economy as a single problem, rather than a series of unrelated national problems. Thus ownership questions should not be permitted to delay maximum production and consumption for Europe as a whole, which will be its paramount postwar need.

The question of ownership raises the ghosts of prewar arguments between socialists and capitalists—arguments of which the Europeans, having seen Hitler's solution at close range, must be thoroughly sick. Americans have a natural prejudice in favor of private capi-

talism. But the Europeans' most general prejudice will be in favor of the freedom to decide their economic fate for themselves. The European economy is normally only part capitalism. It ranges from the socially progressive, state-guided capitalism of Czechoslovakia, through the famed mixed systems of Scandinavia, to the agricultural feudalism of Hungary and East Prussia. As with language, marriage rites, cooking recipes, and other cultural traits, each European country should be protected in its choice of an economic regime. Americans and Russians alike should understand that this is none of their business.

Yet in permitting the nations as much economic freedom as possible, the European Council will have two duties: (1) to prevent this freedom from taking national autarkic forms; (2) to encourage the maximum intra-European trade and economic collaboration. For this purpose the Council will need several technical agencies or institutions, which will gradually develop a code of European rules and will guide the Continent's economic cooperation and development with relative freedom from political pressures.

*Tariffs.* Between Hitler, lend-lease, and relief, Europe's prewar protectionism will be pretty well smashed. Before it starts to grow again, all European nations should be invited by the Council to join hands in complete intra-European free trade. Certainly all agricultural and raw-material tariffs should be removed, so that consumers in each country may have free access to the cheapest natural resources that Europe affords. This will force the peasants of France, Germany, and other

ex-militarist countries out of their protected grain production and into dairy products and other more nutritive foods, and give an easier market to the grain surplus countries of southeast Europe. As for manufactured goods, the same free-trade principle should apply. "Infant industries" in backward countries like Yugoslavia or Spain, supposedly impeded by free trade, are likelier to grow with the enormous market of all Europe open to them than with a small guaranteed national market. However, they may need temporary subsidies or other concessions to get started. To permit some of the inevitable exceptions that nations will seek, a European Tariff Commission should be set up, its function being to regulate the internal trade problems of the area as a whole.

This arrangement is not a tariff union, though it may grow into that. A tariff union is possible only when all members are ready to merge their foreign policies. We ask Europe's nations to merge their policies only toward each other, not toward the rest of the world. Thus the Netherlands may pursue a low-tariff policy toward the outside world, while Italy remains protectionist; but products of Dutch origin will have free access to Italy, and vice versa. To avoid smuggling, it will, of course, be necessary for each nation to maintain its customs machinery, and for all imports to carry certificates of origin.

In "Relations with Britain," we proposed that the U.S. and Britain at once establish free trade with each other. Our proposals for Europe are based on the same principle: that of widening the areas of free trade rather than trying to generalize all trade treaties equally throughout the world. Someday, when both the Anglo-American and the European free-trade areas are well established, we would hope to see them linked and made one. Indeed, the European Tariff Commission should govern Europe's external trade relations to this extent: if any country offers free trade to all of Europe, Europe should reciprocate (with the same exceptions that apply within Europe) as a unit.

*Transport pool.* The Interallied Committee on Inland Transportation, a subcommittee of the Leith-Ross Committee, has already decided that all United Nations transport equipment sent to Europe, for war or relief, should be pooled. This equipment will include locomotives (Britain's "Austerities"), rolling stock,

rails, trucks, river and canal boats. We propose that this pool become a European Transport Corporation, whose ultimate purpose would be to own and operate all the principal transportation and communications companies in Europe. It should start by taking over all Axis governmental transport, especially the highly strategic German railways (laid out by generals), Hitler's famed *Autobahnen*, Rhine and Danube shipping enterprises, and the Kiel Canal. The other governments of Europe, which already own most of their railways, would wish to share in the control of so important a corporation, which they can do by selling it their own principal transport lines. Thus the ETC would serve as an international agency controlling Europe's basic transport for European, not military or nationalistic, ends. In addition, the ETC or a subsidiary should be given control of a number of key European ports, access to which has caused endless international dispute in the past. They would include Danzig, Hamburg, Trieste, and perhaps many others, and would be declared European territory, free ports open to the trade of the whole world.

*Currency.* As our troops advance, the currencies in the lands beyond the front will begin to fall or fluctuate wildly with the course of battle. That is all to the good for purposes of demoralizing the enemy. But as soon as the United Nations control a country, they should stabilize the currency at once, even if that currency is the mark (or tied to the mark). The money in the people's pockets must be made good. When occupation is complete, each European currency should bear a fixed relationship to a strong international unit, either the dollar or the pound.

The problem will then be to keep this relationship stable. As normal trade resumes, the old question of balance of payments will reappear.

Fortunately this problem has recently received official recognition in the exchange of British and U.S. proposals for post-war currency stabilization. Lord Keynes's plan would give the leading trading countries (notably Britain) the dominant voice on the governing board of his "genuinely international" Clearing Union. The American plan provides for voting control of an international stabilization fund in proportion to assets contributed, one asset being gold, which is almost a U.S. monopoly. No doubt the patriotic aspects of each plan will be

compromised, and some sort of international bank or fund will be set up, with headquarters either in Washington or London or both. If so, the currencies of Europe will look outside the Continent for a final judgment on their international value.

This is logical. For even after the increase of intra-European trade that would follow our no-tariff proposals, the countries of Europe will rely for raw materials and loans on the big overseas countries. But there is one feature of the Keynes plan which, whether it prevails internationally or not, can and should be adapted to the uses of Europe. This is its emphasis on the need for economic changes within countries whose international balances are consistently one-sided. For this and other purposes, we propose the creation of a regional European bank. It could be a branch of whatever World Bank is set up, and could represent Europe as a unit in the World Bank's councils.\*

The European Bank would start business when each European member nation makes a deposit with it and arranges to make loans. As a standard of value for all national currencies and central bank deposits, the bank should adopt an international unit ("bancor," "unitas," gold, or whatever) in terms of which all exchange transactions between the member nations are carried out. To maintain stability and to protect itself against losses, the bank should require each country to keep its demands for other currencies (European or non-European) in balance with the demands of other countries for its currency. When the volume of international trade does not result in a balance, the country that has a shortage must borrow from the bank. But the borrowing should be permitted only to take care of temporary situations; if the balance is not restored within a reasonable period, through an increase of the borrower's exports or by means of long-term capital transactions, other measures will be called for. These may be anything from a moderate revaluation of the currency in question to a decision that the chronically borrowing country must be merged into a larger economic unit, in which case the identity of its currency

disappears. It is important to note that such a condition of imbalance can be permanently corrected in only one or a combination of three ways: (1) the productivity of the chronically borrowing country must be raised, (2) its standard of living must be lowered, or (3) some of its people must migrate.

If the European Bank succeeds in keeping all European currencies naturally stable, it will simplify the job of the World Bank, which will be trying to do the same thing for the world. The European Bank can also fill other functions of a branch bank, such as borrowing from the World Bank in the name of Europe, and distributing such loans among its own member nations as best suits the needs of Europe as a whole.

*Economic and agricultural development.* To correct the economic instabilities that the bank uncovers, the Council will need another agency, perhaps allied with the bank, but concerned primarily with planning and new investment. This agency would also work closely with the European Tariff Commission in planning new industries in backward areas. Planning investment on a European basis, so that Germany's industrial leadership can be equalized, is also important for reasons of security. Another developmental job will be a Europe-wide public-works program, as part of a general anti-depression policy.

But perhaps the greatest need for planning is in agriculture. All Europe will be better fed if the Council will undertake a coordinated program to reform food production. Not only in Germany but in France, Italy, and other countries, pre-war agricultural development was distorted by the desire for military self-sufficiency. Lacking capital and modern techniques, the farmers of peasant Europe usually sowed most of their land to grains as a cash crop. The result was poverty and outright malnutrition. The solution must be to turn the farming of peasant Europe and of much of Western Europe toward diversified and intensive agriculture: fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy products—the so-called "protective" foods. This program can be carried out by education, temporary subsidies or grants, irrigation and drainage, and the removal of tariff and trade restrictions. It can be started immediately after the war ends, when the United Nations relief organization begins to feed the Continent's hungry millions. As soon as the problem of outright starvation is in

\*The Clearing Union proposed by Lord Keynes, in order to limit the governing board to twelve or fifteen members, provides for just this sort of group representation.

hand, the relief organization, and later the Council's developmental agency, should supply seeds, fertilizer, breeding stock, equipment, and instruction to induce the farmers to change their methods. Peasant traditions, ignorance, and the low purchasing power of the industrial areas will make the achievement of a balanced diet in Europe a slow process. It may take generations; but it will not be too soon to start as soon as the occupation is under way.

*Cartels.* The cartel system, a peculiarly European institution, has helped to unify Europe economically; but it has also been a tool of war, especially in Germany, and a serious impediment to a rising standard of living. Partly for economic and partly for security reasons, therefore, we propose that the trusts and cartels in a number of strategic industries, such as steel, copper, aluminum, heavy chemicals, and aircraft manufacture, be broken up and placed under European supervision. For this purpose the Council will need another economic agency, probably even a European Economic Court. This court should make periodic inspection of the order books of the formerly cartelized key industries. They should not be allowed to take armaments orders without permission of the court, nor to enter into any price or production agreements with their competitors, nor to dump their products outside Europe.

Thus competition would be enforced in at least a few spheres of European business. The principles of the Sherman Act are unfamiliar in Europe, but they have a special relevance there. Their application would not only help to recreate that valuable class of small and medium-sized businessmen whom Hitler has been killing off; it would also stimulate an atmosphere of initiative and competitive effort in Europe that will make for postwar expansion. Perhaps, having discovered the advantages of competition in a few industries, the European Council's economic technicians will find ways to extend it to others. They may work out a method of offering a charter of European incorporation, exempting such industries from national controls, if, in return, they subject themselves to a European commercial code and real competition.

#### *Who Should Get Nazi-Held Property?*

Last January 5, the United Nations issued a declaration reserving the "right to declare invalid all transfer of, or

dealings with, the property, rights and interests of every description in the territories under the control of the governments with which they are at war. This warning applies whether such transfers have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily effected." This means that the Nazis will be stripped of all the plunder they have gained throughout Europe. In the process there will be the most extensive revision of property rights in history, at least since the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The problems involved in restoring every sort of tangible and intangible asset, from the emerald brooch now adorning some German soldier's wife to an equity in some now nonexistent business, will be fantastically difficult. If they are to be solved with even an approximation of justice, they must be threshed out over a period of years and by a specially created United Nations court, which will have to establish its own precedents as it goes along. For accumulating and clearing information on this tangled business, a United Nations committee of experts has already been set up in London.

Beyond this, there is not a great deal that can be suggested in concrete terms. However, in its approach to the problem, the court should adopt two elementary principles:

- 1) No business control of any sort should be left in Nazi hands anywhere in the world.
- 2) Until Germany has regained its place in civilized society . . . no German resident of Germany should be allowed to own or control any enterprise beyond the borders of Germany.

Simple as these principles are, their application will cause a mare's-nest of complexities. The first will be to decide who is a Nazi—since all the collaborators and henchmen will immediately try to crawl over to our side. As a rough guess beforehand, perhaps one-third of the top business executives in occupied countries, half of those of satellite countries, and 80 per cent in Germany proper will eventually have to be fired. But it should not be done all at once. To keep production going, United Nations administrators (corresponding to the Nazis' own commissars) should take charge in every business where changes are called for, and issue orders that everybody else should remain at work until discharged.

or replaced. They will, of course, need to cultivate the aid and advice of trustworthy workers and subexecutives in the businesses they take over.

After the period of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the administrators should turn the properties back to their rightful owners, whenever the latter can be found. If there is no one to raise a claim, either because the enterprises have always been in German hands or because the legitimate owners have been killed without leaving heirs, the administrators would have various alternatives. They could turn the properties over to the states for nationalization. They could sell them to competent, trustworthy private individuals, perhaps even financing such men. Or they could adopt a third alternative: turn them into cooperatives.

There are strong recommendations for this last course. By their very nature, cooperatives train those who participate in them in democratic methods; and while teaching self-reliance, they also teach interdependence—in a word, cooperation. These are qualities that we shall want to encourage. Moreover, while satisfying the European urge for amalgamation and integration, they also enforce competition. There have been many instances, espe-

cially in Sweden, where cooperatives have broken cartel-rigged price structures. Most important, the common people of Europe have had a great deal of experience with cooperatives, understand them, and like them.

Before the Nazis came to power, about one-seventh of the population of Europe belonged to one or another cooperative group. The English Cooperative Wholesale Society has grown during the war; but in occupied Europe the Nazis have confiscated co-op properties and funds and done their best to uproot the whole idea. Indications are that they have not succeeded; that the movement will command at least as many supporters once the Nazis are removed; and that with the restoration of the physical equipment the system can be put back in working order rapidly. If the orphan properties were handed over as well, the system could begin to function earlier and might soon give to many troubled parts of Europe the stable, satisfying character of the Swedish "mixed system" economy.

—*The United States in the New World. IV. Relations with Europe*. New York. Prepared under the auspices of the editors of *Fortune*, 1943, pp. 14-15, 21. Reprinted from the April 1943 *Fortune* by special permission of the Editors.

## 5. A PROPOSAL FOR THE RESTITUTION OF CONFISCATED PROPERTIES

By ERNEST MUNZ

... What role then can restitution—which at first seems to be a long-term problem—play in the initial maintenance and economic reincorporation of the returning Jews? There are a number of possibilities, all of which have, however, one supposition in common: the establishment in time—the element of time is paramount—of a juridical basis as well as of competent bodies free to act independently either in the name of Jewry as a whole or on behalf of an international rehabilitation center.

Some of the possibilities may briefly be outlined as follows:

1. Certain properties to be restituted are fit for immediate ascertainment and seizure. The formidable amount of Jewish property that has passed into the hands of public corporations falls in this category, e.g., blocked accounts in national banks (which accounts also include

a substantial portion of the proceeds of the confiscation of Jewish enterprises); property confiscated by the Gestapo; frozen bank accounts; deposited securities; payments on special taxes such as the capital levy on emigration (*Reichsfluchtsteuer*); outstanding state pensions; etc. In most such cases it will be possible to determine expropriated Jewish property by a mere investigation of official records. A provisional seizure of such assets in favor of a provisional trust fund would be possible through the institutions protecting the interests of the claimants and would be made without waiting for the actual claim on behalf of the individual holding title to it (whose whereabouts might not always be established).

2. A great many Jewish enterprises in the occupied countries have been handed over to so-called "racial Germans" (*Folksdeutsche*) or to members of the

various quisling parties. It cannot at present be foreseen what occupied regions will be liberated before the cessation of hostilities, or, in other words, what sections will be evacuated only simultaneously with the collapse of the German military machine. In any case it is to be assumed that, during the disorder of the actual collapse, many owners of Jewish property will escape, be arrested, or may in some way be lost sight of. Similar conditions may arise in the course of a violent political change in the Axis countries themselves, where the confiscation and nationalization of Jewish enterprises have mostly resulted in their being handed over to particularly "deserving" members of the fascist organizations. In all such instances, the agencies entrusted with the protection of all claimants for restitution would have provisionally to seize, safeguard and administer the assets in question.

1. All Jewish property not suitable for immediate transfer could, as soon as the claim is established and the existence of the claimed asset made sure of, serve as a basis for credit, a provision which would greatly facilitate the tasks of the relief work. Such loans could be granted either by the relief organizations themselves or by monetary establishments which, working on a non-profit basis, would have to be affiliated with these organizations. So long as the claim is not fully proved, loans on smaller assets could be kept within the framework of mere relief and in proportion to the prospects of a recovery of the property in question. When these prospects become more concrete, additional loans could be made up to such sums as would enable the receiver to embark upon a productive occupation. Greater assets will naturally offer possibilities on a larger scale.

All instances thus far dealt with encompassed the possibility of provisional custody, or the idea of "first aid" to rightful claimants. Another important problem concerns the question of the extent to which restitution claims may be used to assist that great majority which either has no claims or whose claims are neither suitable for seizure nor constitute a credit basis.

1. Cases of deceased title-holders will occur whose heirs are either dead or cannot be found. The civil codes of most Continental countries do not allow intestate estates to be inherited by other than certain close relatives; in the absence of such kin the property escheats. In countries which will be found guilty of the mass extermination of Jews, it would only

be just to prevent the State from inheriting the estates of the murdered. These properties should be utilized, in some form or another, for the relief of the surviving. In view of the tragedy of the situation, it may really be hoped that claims falling into this category will thus be made use of for Jewish reconstruction purposes. This plan could be put into practice by a total or partial transfer of assets to a Jewish reconstruction fund, or by allotting this fund an even share in the income accruing to the State out of such titles.

2. A capital levy on assets due to individual persons—a further possibility which may be devised—would provide the means for the reconstruction fund. Possible levies on claims made by emigrants abroad who have no intention of returning to their original homeland would also fall into this category. Based on juridical regulations, such levies could be collected either on behalf of a Jewish reconstruction fund or accrue to the latter by way of a general rehabilitation fund, or by some Government agency.

3. With regard to emigrants who do not intend to return to their original homeland, a broad scheme could be established regulating a voluntary surrender of claims, or parts of such claims, to the Jewish reconstruction fund. These emigrants represent a considerable portion of the owners of Jewish pre-war property. Apart from purely ideological motives which—supported by appropriate propaganda—could well lead these people to relinquish a portion of their claims, the following additional considerations should be taken into account:

(a) Compensation to be paid for the collection and administration of pertinent assets;

(b) the impossibility of enjoyment by the claimant of the proceeds of the property in question whether on account of legal restrictions in the respective countries, difficulties of capital transfer, or because property rights cannot be utilized in the absence of, and without personal collaboration by, the claimant.

This scheme encompasses not only monetary claims but any kind of property including industrial and commercial enterprises. To a great number of people the operation and management of such enterprises may offer an opportunity of re-entering productive occupations.

—"Restitution in Post-War Europe," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, August 1943, pp. 371-380.

## 6. NO SPECIAL RESTITUTION PRIVILEGES FOR JEWS BY HIRAM MOTHERWELL

This will be one of the most complex and tragic of all the super-government's obligations, especially as it relates to the millions of the Jewish population who have been persecuted by the Nazis, the Quislings, and the little Lavalettes. The super-government cannot generally undertake to restore to the Jews the property which the Nazis have stolen from them. The vast fines and wholesale robberies to which all Europe has been subjected can never be made good. The *status quo ante* can never be restored. Since that is impossible, there can be no discrimination in favor of any one race or group. And, as I have pointed out elsewhere, not even real estate to which a clear title once existed can always be restored.

And, still more tragic perhaps, the super-government cannot undertake the

instant return of exiled populations to their former homes. Rather it will have to throw its influence toward keeping all exiles and refugees where they are until orderly arrangements can be made for their return.

To the moral sense it may seem intolerable that the sufferings of these people should be permitted to continue for a single day after victory is achieved. But the effective righting of wrongs must come after the super-government has acquired some measure of control over all elements of the situation. One of the greatest services that Jewish communities and congregations in America and elsewhere can contribute to reconstruction will be to counsel infinite patience.

—*The Peace We Fight For*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1943, p. 122. By permission of the publishers.

## 7. NAZI STARVATION POLICY

By BORIS SHUB AND Z. WARHAFTIG

Today the list of foods which Jews concentrated in Poland are expressly forbidden to eat includes:

All meat, poultry, fish, eggs, milk, vegetables, white flour, wheat bread, fruits and fruit juices.

In Germany the present schedule of foods explicitly banned to Jews is about as all-embracing. It includes:

All poultry, fish, game, milk, fresh vegetables, dried legumes, white bread, flour, rice, fruits, sweets, coffee and tea, and their substitutes.

A diet without the above foods furnishes Jews with only a minute fraction of the nutrients necessary to sustain life. This is starvation, for with so little protein and no known source of fat, the body must feed on its own tissues and cells until it is destroyed.

Pregnant Jewish women and nursing mothers, as well as Jewish infants and small children have never received the special rations of whole milk which go not only to German women and children, but in lesser amounts to the women and children of occupied countries as well. Today Jewish mothers and children receive no milk at all. Jews are also excluded from supplementary rations al-

lotted to families with three or more children. The explanation for this comes from a prominent Nazi jurist, *Oberregierungsrat Hans Kuppers*:

"The German people is in no way interested in fostering the multiplication of the Jewish people."

Jews have always been excluded from extraordinary rations allotted on special occasions or in certain areas. The role of the *Sonderkulagen* has already been described. Last July a decree was enacted for the Reich and the "incorporated" territories providing special food allowances for weddings and marriage jubilees. To promote good cheer during such festivities, the German edict allows additional meat, butter or margarine, bread, sugar, eggs, and coffee substitute for a table of twelve guests. The text of this benevolent decree contains one reservation: it does not apply to Jews, Poles and gypsies.

Jewish forced laborers toiling for the Reich receive none of the added protective foods and fats allotted on a graduated scale to workers in Germany and occupied territory. Able-bodied Jews of Germany and Axis Europe are generally conscripted for arduous work in quarries, iron, coal and sulphur mines; on road

construction gangs; in saw mills, and in textile factories turning out uniforms for the Wehrmacht. Yet they obtain only the starvation rations allotted to Jewish "normal consumers." In armament factories where milk is supplied to laborers as an antidote for metallic poisons, Jewish workers get none. In Rumanian-held Soviet territory, Jews work sixteen hours a day in penal labor colonies on one-eighth the rations furnished to Rumanian soldiers.

In Poland, where the majority of able-bodied Jews under Nazi subjugation are employed as forced laborers, their provisioning was largely the responsibility of the captive Jewish communities. The latter were expected to share the starvation rations allocated by Nazi officials for the ghetto with the inmates of forced labor camps. . . .

In August 1942 the Rumanian government decreed that henceforth Jews were to pay a tax of 16 lei on a loaf of bread weighing slightly more than a pound, in addition to the regular price of 14 lei. Thus Jews must pay more than double the general price for bread. Last November a Rumanian newspaper suggested the total cancellation of Jewish bread cards. In January 1943 the bread rations for Jews were cut to 35 ounces a week as compared to 61.6 ounces for the Christian population.

For the month of May 1942 sugar rations for Jews in Bucharest amounted to 7 ounces compared to 21 ounces for the Christian population. By September, however, the ration for Jews was cut to 3½ ounces per month while the "Aryan" population continued to receive 21 ounces, or six times as much.

Authentic information regarding the occupied Baltic countries is scant, but two items which appeared in the German press indicate the general pattern. In November 1941 the *Deutsche Zeitung in Ostland* announced that Jews of Riga were receiving one-half the rations allotted to the Lettish population.

In occupied Lithuania, when the rations for Germans and Lithuanians were published last spring, it was provided that Germans were to receive about twice as much food as the native population. Appended to the ration schedule was the curt announcement that Jews were to receive half the Lithuanian rations.

In occupied Poland, where the majority of the surviving European Jews are now concentrated, the starvation rations system for the Jewish people is

most rigorously enforced. It applies equally to native Polish Jews and to the continuing stream of Jewish deportees from Western and Central Europe. Although the list of foods which are totally denied to Jews in Poland includes almost all the protective and vitamin foods, that is not all. Bread and sugar rations have been progressively reduced, potato allowances have become more and more sporadic, and other items have been cut to the vanishing point. In September 1940 the controlled press announced that in Warsaw Jews were receiving slightly more than 1½ pounds of bread per week, compared to the Polish bread ration of about 3 pounds. In November the Jewish Council of Chmielnik-Kielecki announced that bread rations had been temporarily raised from about 18 ounces to 1½ pounds. By the end of 1941, bread rations for Jews in the Warsaw ghetto were down to about 20 ounces per week. Last summer, however, there was a further drop to only one pound of bread a week for Warsaw's dwindling Jewish population. By this time bread was about all the Jews were getting, for in the meantime potato consignments to the ghettos had been drastically curtailed, and allowances of other items had become negligible.

In 1940 and the early part of 1941 Jews in a number of Polish cities, not including Warsaw, received an average of about 4.4 pounds of potatoes per week. In a few small towns the quota was somewhat higher during that period. But that was two years ago. Since word came through that in June 1941 the Warsaw ghetto had received 67 tons of potatoes, or only 1.4 ounces a week per capita, there has been no specific information of further potato allotments to Jews in Poland. Sugar rations meanwhile had dropped to about 1.2 ounces per week.

For all practical purposes black bread is all that stands between the Jews of the ghettos and death. Yet they receive less of this than any people in Europe. They obtain only 32% of the bread rations for Poles in the General Government; 29% of the Greek and Belgian rations; 25.7% of the French; 25% of the Dutch; 24% of the Norwegian; 22% of the Czech and only 20% of the bread received by normal consumers in Germany.

To complete the picture, rations for Jews are sometimes entirely suspended. Thus in Lodz the Germans announced that between January 27th and February 2 1942 no food would be sold to Jews. Moreover, Jews who are deported must

often wait an indefinite period before obtaining new ration cards. In the interim they must look to the starving Jews of their place of exile for food. In Bratislava, Slovakia, a local ordinance provides that if a Jewish family retains the ration card of a deported member, all in the household lose their ration cards. . . .

More insidious have been the inroads of tuberculosis, another hand-maiden of hunger. Among the Christian population of Warsaw, tubercular deaths during the first six months of 1941 rose by 231 percent over the comparable period in 1939. Among the Jews the increase was 535 percent. This five-fold rise in tubercular deaths within the first two years of war does not reveal the full ravages of the disease. Two more years of hunger have passed since tubercular deaths were counted last. In the meantime the incidence of the disease among the subjugated Jews of Europe has soared everywhere. A Swiss newspaperman describing the scenes of "inconceivable misery" which he encountered in the Lublin ghetto last summer concluded:

*"It is therefore not surprising that in this locality, as in all other ghettos, tuberculosis rages."*

The state of Jewish children still haunting the ghetto alleys may be compared only to that of the orphaned and disinherited spawn, the *besprizornie*, of the Russian famine era. With this important difference: the Jewish children of 1943 are prisoners within the ghetto and cannot roam through the villages in search of food. Some have tried to slip past the German sentries who guard the ghetto walls. Perhaps a few have succeeded. Those who are spotted are cut down by machine gun fire. Swift death is no deterrent for others who die slowly of hunger. As a punitive measure and warning, according to information which came out of Poland via the underground, German policemen publicly drowned 30 Jewish children in the water-filled clay pits near Okopowa Street, Warsaw, in October 1941.

Desperate mothers who cannot scrape together enough to keep their children alive, have been known to abandon them in the frantic hope that the impoverished Jewish community will feed them. Alone among the young of the oppressed peoples, Jewish children receive none of the protective foods which their bodies vitally need. They are totally deprived of milk, eggs, meat and fresh vegetables. They are an easy mark for death.

*Back in December 1941 the death rate among Jewish children of Warsaw was estimated to be 30 times as high as among the Polish children. In Salonika during the first year of occupation 3,000 Jewish children under the age of 14 perished. . . .*

In May 1941 burial certificates were issued by the Warsaw Jewish Council for 1545 reported deaths. During the same month, however, Gestapo officials at the Jewish cemetery counted 3881 corpses. In June only 2620 burial certificates were issued, but 4290 bodies were carted to the burial grounds. This despite the penalty for failing to report death in the family; despite the torment of denying to the last remains of one's brother, wife, or child the final rites of the Jewish faith. But today the dead leave behind an inheritance more tantalizing than gold—a piece of blue paper stamped with the letter "J" good for a pound of bread a week. That pound of bread often spells the difference between life and death for those who are still alive. (*"People who are still alive"* is how the Jews of Warsaw were described by a Polish writer in the controlled press nearly three years ago.) And so the Jews strip their next of kin of identification, and under cover of night abandon their wasted bodies in the streets. The Gestapo is aware of this practice and holds the Jewish Council responsible as a collective hostage for the unaccounted dead. The clerks of the German Food Transfer Office meticulously multiply 450 grams of bread by the number of corpses counted at the cemetery, and subtract this figure from the ghetto's weekly bread quota. But despite Gestapo threats, Jewish families continue to divide dead man's bread among them until they are caught and punished, or until they themselves perish.

*"Over the Jewish district there have appeared all the Horsemen of the Apocalypse: War, Famine, Pestilence, Death."*

That was written in 1940 before starvation had become a science. A year later, when a Swedish journalist visited Warsaw, he wrote:

*"Hunger in the ghetto is frightful. The inhabitants seem to be living corpses. Their faces and eyes are sunken. . . . Jewish life in the ghettos is tragic, gloomy, and hopeless. The Jews wait and long for a new Moses."*

That was in 1941. If time in the ghetto is measured by the hour glass of hunger, pestilence and slow death, centuries have elapsed since then. A Polish doctor who escaped from Warsaw last year narrated

this page out of purgatory:

"I saw with my own eyes nine Jews lying against the wall of a corner house at Franciszanka and Nalewki streets in the last throes of death from starvation . . . At first when a man or a woman fell on the pavements of the Warsaw ghetto from hunger, people tried to do something to help the victim, but now there are so many Jews dead on the street that people avert their eyes and pass by.

"Around those nine dying Jews, a group of children were hovering, waiting for the victims to die so that they could strip the bodies of their clothes, especially the shoes."

That was in 1942. A few months later a Hungarian visitor to the German capital described what he had seen in these words:

"The Jews of Berlin are very pale. Their faces are waxen as if already wearing a death mask. When I passed by one of these Jews, I could hear his bones softly rattling."

What has happened since is cloaked in darkness and horror. Last summer Herbert Backe was said to have proposed the mass extermination of the Jews as a "food conservation measure." How far that process has already progressed only the German government knows. In the meantime German-organized starvation is inexorably destroying the Jewish people. Nothing has yet been done to turn the tide.

*—Starvation Over Europe (Made in Germany). A Documented Record 1943.*  
New York, The Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and World Jewish Congress, 1943, pp. 72-85. By permission.

## 8. WILL THE SURVIVING EUROPEAN JEWS MIGRATE?

By MAX GOTTSCHALK

Will there be a great migration of European Jews after the war? When Hitler came to power there were in Europe, exclusive of the U.S.S.R., about seven million Jews. In *Mein Kampf*, which Hitler wrote in 1923 and presented to the world as the bible of modern times, he announced his intention to purge Europe of its Jewish population. He proceeded to the realization of his intention in two stages. Prior to 1941, he asserted an increasing pressure on the Jews of Germany, and afterwards on those of Austria and other countries as they progressively came under his power, to compel them to emigrate to the other continents. Only the barriers erected by the various countries of immigration against the admission of the refugees prevented the emigration of the large majority of the Jews of Europe desirous of fleeing Hitler's hell. In round figures, only 500,000 Jews succeeded in emigrating overseas, of whom 163,400 went to the United States, 215,600 to Palestine, 83,000 to South America and 38,000 to other countries overseas. About 100,000 more entered England and the neutral countries. Between the outbreak of the war and the summer of 1941, an estimated 600,000 of the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Jews who had come under control of the U.S.S.R. were evacuated by the Soviets to the interior and thus saved from the invading Nazis. Some of them have now reached Teheran and other

Iranian cities or have even arrived in Palestine.

Altogether about 1,200,000 escaped. To this figure should be added the English Jews and the native Jews of the various European countries which are still neutral. They number about 400,000. We may therefore estimate the total number not under the yoke of the Nazis or their satellites as 1,600,000. Of the seven million European Jews there remain about 5,400,000 under Hitler's domination. In addition, about one million Jewish citizens of the Soviet Union were unable to flee Hitler's invading armies, and so came under his rule.

In 1941 Hitler decided that the emigration of Jews was proceeding too slowly. He decided to eliminate the Jews by a series of more rapid extermination procedures, the barbarousness and cruelty of which we shall not stress here. We shall content ourselves with indicating that the Polish Jews were immured in ghettos or subjected to forced labor, and that the Jews of other countries under his control were removed from their homes and transported under indescribably inhuman conditions to centers created in Poland or in the invaded parts of the U.S.S.R. Only about 25,000 Jews have succeeded in escaping from under his yoke since the summer of 1942, mainly to Switzerland and Spain.

It is known with certainty that a con-

siderable number of the deported Jews are at the present time victims of famine, tuberculosis and typhus, brought about by the conditions of life imposed on them by the Germans. Or they are already victims of deliberate extermination by execution. How many have died thus? Nobody knows exactly. Hundreds of thousands? Certainly. Several millions? Perhaps. Each day sees a lengthened list of martyrs. The number of European Jews therefore is constantly decreasing. And if the war should last several years more, it is certain that Hitler's plan of total extermination will be completely carried out.

But it is my belief that the victory of the United Nations over the Nazis is near. It is in terms of months and not in years that I calculate the time which separates us from the unconditional surrender of the Nazis in Europe.

We may therefore hope that of the 5,400,000 Jews that came under Nazi domination in 1941, there will probably survive at least three and a half to four million.

We thus arrive finally at the question which has been asked: Will there be a great migration of European Jews after the war? And what will be its nature and extent?

After the United Nations have achieved victory we hope that the various countries of Europe will be governed by those democratic principles which are at the base of the American and British constitutions and that Jews will enjoy in consequence political rights and security as do other citizens. But even if this proves to be true, when Victory is won most of the Jews who have survived in Europe will have been torn from their homes and transported to places hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles away. Their health will have been undermined, if not ruined; they will have been stripped of their wealth, for the Nazis permitted them to take away only a few dollars and a bag containing a few personal objects. All the rest will have been confiscated. Commercial and industrial enterprises, as well as their real property, will have been transferred to non-Jews—to Germans and Italians, but also to Poles, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Rumanians and Hungarians.

The first instinctive reaction, "the homing instinct," as Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, calls it, might prompt the Jews to wish to take a train back to their former homes. This will probably be impossible for some

time. What will the situation be when they are able to return to their homes?

Some few of them may succeed in adjusting themselves to the life of the communities to which they have been transferred and will wish to remain there after the war.

Some who do return to the town where they formerly lived, may find that their own homes have been destroyed. Others may be more fortunate and discover their houses still intact, but occupied by other people. What are the Jews to do? Should they go to court and have the interlopers thrown out? There certainly will be official provisions entitling them to do so, but this will involve a slow and complicated process. In some respects, it may even be somewhat dangerous, for it may provide a basis for renewed anti-Semitism.

Or let us visualize the case of the more fortunate person who will be able to regain his former home or enterprise. There is more to this than appears on the surface. This Jew will have to consider the environment in which he is going to live, for he will be surrounded by exactly the same people who persecuted him some years before, or who made no protest against the way the Nazis and anti-Semites behaved towards him. He will be surrounded by the very people whose victim he was. Finally, there is no doubt that in a Europe devastated by aerial bombardment and land warfare, suffering from political, economic and social upheaval, the effort demanded of each individual in the task of reconstruction will be very great.

Now suppose that opportunities are offered to these people to emigrate to new countries where life is very different—where there is no trace of the cruel events which they have just experienced, where if anti-Semitism is present, it has not turned into barbarism, and where there are great opportunities to begin life anew as farmers, industrial workers, or in some other capacity. It is easy to visualize that among the younger people, some will eagerly grasp such opportunity to migrate and leave the countries in which they have been so unhappy. The reaction of elderly people will probably not be the same. When you have lived in a country over a period of years and have accumulated a lifetime of personal and sentimental attachments, you may not have the strength and the will to undertake such a drastic step as traveling thousands of miles to countries where languages are spoken which you don't understand, and where

the habits are new to you. It is only natural that you would hesitate before taking such a step. However, the more unfortunate among these reluctant individuals will probably accept these opportunities.

Nor should we forget those who, at the termination of hostilities, will find themselves still living where they were at the outbreak of war. They, too, may be motivated by the same desires to emigrate that will prompt Jews who were removed from their communities during the war.

Who is going to help them? Who will offer them the chance to emigrate?

I think that the Jewish organizations which have always dealt with problems of migration will step in at that moment and help these Jews to emigrate singly and gradually. That is what is already happening in North Africa, where the Jews who were stranded or interned are emigrating to the United States, Mexico, and the South American countries with the technical help of the Casablanca offices of the Hias-Ica Emigration Association and the major financial support of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

I do not think that very large numbers of Jews will be able to emigrate individually. We therefore have to consider whether there is a way to achieve mass or group migration. Until now I have discussed only Jewish emigration, but it has been asserted by many statesmen that non-Jews will also have to migrate in very large numbers. President Roosevelt, as early as October 1939, stated his opinion that ten to twenty million people would have to emigrate. Mr. Sumner Welles, on a more recent occasion, expressed a similar view, as did many others. We must, therefore, view our problem as being not merely Jewish, but part of the general problem of mass migration.

To solve this problem, we must think in terms of a new international organization, which will have to be established. This idea is being explored both by official organizations, like the International Labor Office, and by private bodies, like the Coordinating Foundation. Their projects exclude any racial discrimination. They favor the organization of "mixed"—that is, both agricultural and industrial—groups and communities. Naturally, these settlements will require all kinds of professions and trades to make possible the life of the whole community. Such an enterprise would be a colossal

one, if you visualize these communities in terms of large settlements. Nevertheless, it can be safely predicted that in the coming months a plan for creating an international migration organization will materialize.

Returning to the Jews, we should ask ourselves where they will go. To which country will they be able to migrate? Many of them will, of course, desire to go to Palestine. There is no doubt that the Holy Land offers large possibilities for immigrant absorption. Many different and contradictory estimates have been made about Palestine's absorptive capacity, but the important thing to keep in mind is that, whatever the estimates may be at any given time, the absorptive capacity is not static. It varies with the development of the country itself and with the general economic situation throughout the world.

The problem of migration to Palestine, however, is not so much a problem of economic absorptive capacity as of politics. Under the British White Paper of 1939, which is still in force today, only about 30,000 more Jews can be admitted up to the spring of 1944; after that time immigration will come to a stop. Officially Great Britain affirms that it will stick to this policy. Nevertheless, in view of the dire need of countries of settlement for the Jews, an agreement may be reached satisfying, at least partially, all interested parties.

There are other large countries where many people could migrate and build new and happy lives. Let us take South America as an example. Brazil, alone, is not a country but a continent which could absorb vast numbers of immigrants. A study has appeared which makes an estimate, considered conservative by experts, that Brazil could absorb 400 million people. There can be no doubt that there is enough room in Brazil alone for all those in the rest of the world desirous of migrating in the next few decades. But there, too, immigration is a political problem, because today all South American countries are almost completely closed, especially so when it comes to Jewish immigration.

At the end of this war, the South American republics will, it is to be hoped, be part of the United Nations, and will participate with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the new international economic setup, based on cooperation. If that is so, these countries will open their doors to bring in the resources vital to their development. I have no doubt that such will be the

course of events. Both capital and manpower are necessary to the development of these countries. Capital will be made available according to the plans of the proposed international organization for migration.

If the countries of immigration and the money for their development are available, the only question remaining is that of manpower. Jews and non-Jews will be admitted to these countries under the conditions mentioned above. I do not think that every Jew will be admitted. Some form of discrimination is bound to be applied to immigrants. Probably only selected individuals, Jews and non-Jews, who are professionally qualified, will be admitted. Since the percentage of farmers or industrial workers is relatively small among Jews, they will have to be retrained in Europe or in the countries of immigration.

Experience with the retraining of Jews has proved that extremely favorable results can be achieved both in agricultural and industrial work. The proof is supplied by the Jewish agricultural enterprises in the United States, where there are 100,000 Jews on the soil, as brought out in Dr. Gabriel Davidson's recent book, *Our Jewish Farmers*, and by those in Palestine, Argentina, Canada and elsewhere. It is proved by the hundreds of thousands of Jewish industrial workers and artisans in this country; they are in occupations quite different from the commercial pursuits of the Jews of Eastern Europe.

Thus far we have dealt only with east-to-west migration movements. The question can also be raised whether there

will be west-to-east movements back to Europe. This problem is a very different one. The very great majority of those who came to the United States, Great Britain, Central and South America have by now adjusted themselves to their new life. They enjoy full security and have already become or will soon be citizens. Only a small minority, in part moved by sentimental reasons, will go back, if they find the conditions abroad satisfactory. Some still have their relatives abroad. Others left valuable property or businesses, which they will want to recover, or positions (such as professorships or Government posts) which they will want to reoccupy. This is a minor problem, as far as numbers go, in comparison with the movement from Europe.

In conclusion, we assume that the Jews will everywhere enjoy political, economic and social equality. We must, in any event, do our utmost to make it possible for every Jew who survives in Europe to resume life in his own country. This will be relatively easy for the French, the Dutch, the Belgian, the Norwegian and the Czech Jews who were not at all or only slightly subject to anti-Semitism before the war.

As for the Jews of the other European countries, emigration will provide a favorable solution for those who choose to emigrate. As Professor Eugene Kulischer has explained in his book, *Jewish Migrations*, migrations are a normal phenomenon in the history of mankind and they "have always opened new horizons to persecuted and destitute Jews."

—*Predictions of Things to Come*, September 1941. By permission of the publishers.

## 9. PROPOSED SOLUTION BY MASS EVACUATION

BY VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY

Mass evacuation is the only remedy for the cancer of Jewish distress. It may be superhumanly difficult, it may be atrociously costly, but as it is the only way to save Europe from being hustled into another catastrophe, the difficulties and the expense will have to be faced: when it will, of course, be discovered that the operation, at its maximum, is infinitely easier and cheaper than a modern war, besides being a profitable investment, which a war can never claim to be.

How many will have to be evacuated? The question is important, but it cannot be answered. To begin with, heaven alone knows how many Jews in the Zone of

Distress will survive; and how far southwards, northwards, eastwards and perhaps even westwards the Zone may expand before the crisis ends. Secondly: there probably exists, even in countries which are the home of acute antisemitism (objective or subjective, or both), a certain level at which peaceful symbiosis becomes normally possible between the Gentile majority and a Jewish minority reduced to a proportion small enough to be tolerable. To foretell exactly how deep on the scale that happy level lies is impossible. It will depend upon a whole complex of conditions: the character of the majority people, the natural resources

of the soil, the upward or downward trend of its trade are only the most obvious factors, but not necessarily the most essential. The truth will become apparent only during the process of the migration, and it will probably conform to a kind of osmotic principle; in other words, the area to be evacuated and the reception area will behave like two vessels separated by a diaphragm, each one with its own degree of pressure. The outflow will depend not only on the anti-Jewish factors in Europe but also on the attractiveness of the new home. Theoretically, the outflow will stop when a state of equilibrium has been reached, e.g. when the Polish or the Hungarian or the Roumanian state and society begin to feel that the Jewish exodus has reached its "useful" limit, and that its continuation would be a total loss; whereupon they might conceivably begin to offer the not yet evacuated Jews some kind of enticement or premium for remaining (history records even more incredible cases—when Jews were offered premiums for entering the country). On the other hand, it is also theoretically possible that in spite of such a commendable change of heart the evacuation would still continue on account of the greater appeal, material or ideological, of the reception area.

The only thing that can be said with certainty is that calculations, to be sober, should incline to the maximum.... A solid evacuation policy should reckon with an eventual "ceiling" of some five million Jewish migrants within the ten to fifteen years following the war; and that the first million, taken from all the countries of the Zone, will have to be evacuated at once, at what the Germans would call "lightning" speed, by the same methods and at the same tempo which a modern army would apply to the transport of fifty divisions to a remote theatre of war.

Some critics of evacuation fear that it would have to be "compulsory." This is hardly likely; it will, on the contrary, prove extremely difficult to keep proper order among the multitude of volunteers lining up for places on the waiting list. Other critics merely demand that the mass emigration of Jews should be treated as something concerning the Jews alone, and no business of any government, Polish or Roumanian or Hungarian. Not only should there be no hint of compulsory evacuation; there should be no application of pressure in any form; and if a national government should openly apply itself to organizing the emigration, that would be practically tantamount to pressure. The correct attitude for such a Government

would therefore be, to pretend to ignore the fact that Jewish emigration existed, and especially, that it was necessary, etc. All this is foolish. There is no reason why government and parliament, or citizens, in a State which finds emigration a necessity, should feel bashful about it. On the contrary, it is the State's duty to help the emigrant by every means in its power. Italy before the Great War was an excellent example of such sound, sober and perfectly patriotic treatment of the emigration problem. Italy had no ethnical minorities to get rid of; all her emigrants were of pure Italian breed; but her government was always busy devising shipping facilities, credit facilities, training facilities for the emigrants, and negotiating with the Argentine and other overseas countries for their admission. Whenever it was felt that an Italian cabinet was not properly exerting itself in these directions, the Radical and Socialist opposition criticized it most severely for such dereliction of its true democratic duty. They were quite right: it is a decent government's duty to look after all the needs of all its citizens, and if among such needs there is that of migrating *en masse* in search of conditions which cannot be provided at home, a decent government must give its help, no matter whether these migrants be Gentile or Jewish. As a matter of fact, many Gentiles also will probably have to migrate from East-Central Europe after the war, though it is of course to be expected that the paramount phenomenon in the field of mass migration will be the Jewish exodus. But the touchy inferiority-complex of the non-Zionist Jew should not lead him to take offense at his government's solicitude in acknowledging the existence of a social problem just because the problem happens to be predominantly Jewish.

Neither success nor order can be ensured in the exodus unless it is an international enterprise assisted by every government concerned. The above-mentioned bashful or touchy Jewish politicians probably know it themselves, for they can hardly imagine that arrangements for the transfer of capital or the liquidation of property can be made privately while ministers look the other way. The exodus will have to be a solemn and official performance, undertaken with banners flying; it will require not only administrative measures, but also special legislation, and above all, great international treaties. This cannot be helped and there is no need to shrink from it.

One understands, however, the reasons of this bashful shrinking. Tom and Dick have been room-mates for years; there have been quarrels; now it is finally

agreed that peace is to be restored, but Dick has decided to move to other quarters; the decision is absolutely voluntary, but there is nevertheless something in the very fact that it is Dick and not Tom who has decided to move away. Under these conditions Dick may prefer that Tom should leave him alone to do his house-bunting and packing; should Tom prove too solicitous to help, his solicitude might look like eagerness to get rid of him.

The prickly nature of the drama is obvious; yet the significant thing about the awkwardness of being too anxiously assisted to pack is that it is felt only if Dick is moving to another set of hired lodgings. Imagine for a moment that Dick has inherited a house, and a real freehold property, a thing he has long dreamed of: the whole psychological atmosphere would change, and all the awkwardness would disappear.

This is no idle parable, but a cogent argument. When people who admit the inevitable necessity of "evacuating lost positions" still feel it necessary to insist with so much heat that the process must be absolutely voluntary, that no pressure must be applied, etc., they are simply beating about the bush. The most absolutely voluntary emigration may contain some aspects of compulsion: it depends on what the emigrant expects to find overseas. Imagine the Italian emigrant of fifty years ago leaving Genoa for Buenos Aires: was he migrating of his free will or under pressure? If he felt that he was going into a dismal exile he was an exile; if he felt he was going to meet friends and make his fortune, he was a free adventurer. An exodus of Jews towards a new Dispersion would be equivalent to forcible mass expulsion, no matter how scrupulously the "voluntary" principle was respected and safeguarded. Exodus to a Jewish State will, under all conditions, be spontaneous in the purest sense of the word, and the eagerness of the migrants will be hardly at all diminished by the fact that the new constitutions in the old countries promise civic equality.

On the contrary, the prospect of civic equality may be affected by the fact of evacuation—perhaps very notably and favorably affected. The man in the street, on the average, is never altogether beastly. The importance attributed to this book in the objective "Antisemitism of Things" should help us to avoid over-estimating the malignancy of men: men may vote for

anti-Jewish measures, men may boycott Jewish shops, and may still be decent kind-hearted fellows in other respects. It would do some Jewish leaders an enormous amount of good if they realized this truth once for all, and drew some conclusions from it. The average human biped in the antisemitic Zone does not enjoy downing and barming the Jew; but he is quite willing to do so again and again if he fears that the Jew may crowd him out, economically, socially, or politically. Give the average man a concrete and tangible proof that an earnest endeavor is actually being made to thin out the ranks of his Jewish competitors, and he will probably relax his belligerency. This is not optimism, just as the refusal to believe in the efficiency of equal rights under the climate of the Zone is not pessimism: it is just impartial realism, scornful but benevolent, taking Jew and Gentile at their true value, *terre à terre*. . . .

Mass evacuation applied to the Jewish problem is not an alternative to civic equality: it is a corollary to equality, the indispensable condition of equality, and the only thing which can possibly make the latter a lasting reality for those—be they few or many—who remain.

But this is a side-issue. The essential role and value of evacuation is that it is the only cure for an evil which, if not removed, will continue to pervert humanity to commit further outrages: a thorough, clean and final cure. Also—provided the reception area is a Jewish State—it is a popular cure, a remedy which the overwhelming majority of men of all creeds regard with approval and respect: an ideal sanctified by the Bible and ennobled by the tradition of Zionism, whose consummation would be universally welcomed by all countries inside the Zone of distress, and most nations outside it, and by all Jews—both those who want to go and those who want to remain.

What was said of the equality principle in Poland can be said of the equality principle in general—that complex of claims and dreams which our ancestors called "the Jewish emancipation" can become a reality only under two conditions: the enjoyment of equal rights in every Gentile country, and the existence, somewhere, of a Jewish State.

--*The War and the Jew*, New York, Dial Press, 1942, pp. 124-132. By permission of the publishers.

## 10. A TERRITORIALIST VIEW

By GABRIEL HAUS

Immigration into the Western Hemisphere has very materially improved the conditions under which Jewish people live. Yet it has not set up a sound basis for Jewish national life. Their position never became secure. For together with the Jewish workers came Jewish merchants and professional men, who competed with the old established tradesmen, doctors, lawyers, etc. In the nature of things friction with the people constituting the majority population had to arise. This provides opportunities for political demagogues to engineer an anti-Jewish movement.

The Jewish minority status is thousands of years old. It has always exposed Jews to discrimination and persecution. In recent years thousands upon thousands of Jewish refugees have fled from concentration camps, torture and death. Repeated appeals to the conscience of the world have proved futile. The only reply was the admission of a small and very limited number of refugees into already developed countries. But by this infiltration, if it is sufficiently large, the causes of anti-Semitism are merely transplanted. They are never removed by it. They can be removed only by Jewish colonisation from the bottom up in one of the empty spaces of the world.

Jews have come to realize that infiltration into a developed country never provides them with a secure basis for existence, because it shuts them out from access to the soil and the natural resources. The only sound economic bases for Jewish life is in the primary industries.

Two attempts have been made to protect Jewish interests by setting up Jewish National Homes. One is in Palestine, the other in Biro-Bidjan.

Palestine holds a special place in Jewish life. Jews hoped to create there an economically independent majority, which would safeguard their national interests. But Palestine was unable to accommodate all the Jews who were forced by circumstances to emigrate. The situation is further aggravated by the violent opposition to an influx of Jews.

None the less the Palestine achievement is of permanent value. There are few examples in history of 400,000 people settling in such a small country within 20 years, after centuries of devastation and under unfavourable conditions. This sudden flowering of a barren country stands out as an example of Jewish productive and organizational ability.

A similar policy of establishing a sound basis for Jewish life through concentration in one territory was undertaken by the Soviet authorities in Biro-Bidjan, in Eastern Siberia. But the Jews of the Soviet Union were being absorbed by the growing industry of European Russia, and the opportunities thus opened to them prevailed to a large extent over their desire for national home.

Palestine and Biro-Bidjan indicate the direction for the future. But both together cannot accommodate all the hosts of Jewish emigrants, who must be expected as the result of the present conditions in Europe.

Any great re-settlement policy which will follow this war must include a FREE JEWISH SETTLEMENT. To come into such a plan, Jews must claim their right to colonize one of the empty spaces of the world.

But the claim must not be confused with the pressure which has been and is being exerted on Jews in various countries to leave their homes in Europe. Any such suggestion is entirely incompatible with the Jewish claim for a territory.

Jews must act in their own interest and those of humanity as a whole, without it being implied that they are hereby playing the game of their enemies, who base their ideology on compulsion and force.

It is not by chance that the organization which advocates a concentration of Jewish emigrants in one territory is called—"Freeland." For "Freeland" means a FREE JEWISH LAND as an integral part of a FREE WORLD.

—*Jews and the Post-War World*. London, Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonisation, 1941, pp. 12-14.

## 11. FOR CONTINUED RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION

By ROBERT MOSES

Although a respectable body of church people and liberals want wholesale post-war immigration, sentiment in Congress

and throughout the country is opposed to liberalizing the quotas. Among bills now ready for introduction to further

limit immigration are: one to cut the existing quotas to one third, another to end immigration entirely for five or ten years or until our own domestic employment problem is settled, and a third to change the system so that quotas are based on race rather than nationality. If I have gauged correctly the temper of the country, and particularly of conservatives who are becoming more articulate everywhere, the measures which propose to cut quotas have a better chance on a showdown than those which would liberalize them.

The simple truth is that we are fully as liberal in our immigration laws as any other great nation. Consider, for example, Great Britain and her colonies. No alien can enter the United Kingdom to ply a trade or practice a profession without a special permit from the Ministry of Labor. The number of persons entering Canada yearly from other than the United States, the United Kingdom and the British dominions is negligible. Candidates from continental Europe are not wanted and get in only in small numbers as independent farmers. Ninety per cent of the population of Australia is British, Scottish, Irish and Welsh. There is not the remotest reason to believe that there has been any change in sentiment throughout the British Commonwealth on this subject.

A great deal of nonsense has been talked about the effect of the restrictions on immigrants both before and since the beginning of the second World War. Between 1931 and 1940, 528,431 immigrants were admitted, roughly one eighth of the number who entered in the previous decade. In 1941 approximately 50,000 entered, and in 1942 approximately 29,000. Catholics, Protestants and Jews were admitted because they were from Great Britain, Germany, Italy or elsewhere, without reference to religion. The story that there was discrimination against Jews has nothing to support it. As a matter of fact, between 1933 and 1942, 33 per cent of all immigrants were Jews, and in 1939 and 1940, with the rise of Hitler's terrorism, 52 per cent of all immigrants landing here were of this stock.

Since 1929 immigration has been limited to 150,000 a year—each nation having a fixed quota. Yet the legal quotas have never been filled. Thus Germany and Austria might have sent us 273,000 between 1931 and 1940, but actually sent us only 120,000. Ireland might have sent us 178,000 but contributed only 31,000. Italy with a quota of 58,000 shipped us only

30,000, and Poland, which was entitled to send 65,700, sent in fact only 28,000. In 1938 Germany and Austria sent in 10,000 less than their quota, though in 1939 and 1940 together they exceeded the quota. In some years former immigrants returning to their native countries actually exceeded those arriving.

Why, under the circumstances, force a showdown on this issue? Why precipitate antagonisms which cannot aid us in the war and surely will not make for a better peace? Those who insist that men should be free to move over the surface of the earth in search of work and opportunity can't win this argument in the United States with the people who inhabit it now. As an ultimate objective far off on the horizon it is properly the concern of all idealists if they will only concede that progress in this direction is slow and that our people will not be whipped or driven beyond their convictions and their strength.

The American people are prepared to make great sacrifices to feed and clothe the stricken peoples of Europe and the East, and to get them back on their feet. They will not, however, invite them to come over here by the millions to swamp a domestic economy which will be under the most terrific strain anyway, with perhaps 15,000,000 men and women looking for postwar jobs.

We must assume severe dislocations and unemployment after the war, at best mitigated by public works and other temporary expedients to pave the way for the resumption of private enterprise. Can any sane person advocate that we further complicate our problems by bringing in large numbers of immigrants to compete for comparatively few jobs? Our first duty is to provide our own population, including the returning members of the armed forces, with work, food, shelter and a decent chance to enjoy the victory which they have earned.

The best thing to do about immigration for the present is nothing. Leave the law substantially as it is for the duration with a limit of 150,000 a year and with the same national quotas. We don't need another new commission with a balanced membership and another set of clerks, statistical sharks and publicity directors. Congress has had committees on immigration for years. Let them study necessary amendments to be effective a year or two years after the war. It might be desirable, for example, to permit under proper conditions an additional 50,000

representing cases of extraordinary hardship or exceptional qualifications, and it might be well also to transfer the immigration service to the Department of State, whose diplomatic and consular agents abroad are best equipped to decide initially who shall come over.

There is plenty of time to establish simpler and more understandable rules governing immigration and naturalization which make no wild promises, raise no

false hopes and leave no room for re-  
criminations. Such honesty may give cold  
comfort to cosmic idealists and global  
planners, but it will reflect the considered  
opinion of intelligent and, in the main,  
generous Americans who are proud of  
the fact that they are all immigrants or  
the descendants of immigrants . . .

—*The Reader's Digest*, March 1943, pp.  
42-44. By permission of the publishers.

## 12. POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNAL MIGRATIONS TO WESTERN EUROPE

BY ROBERT VACHER

It is relatively easy to criticize the agricultural policy followed by France in the past; it is much harder to indicate the measures which should be taken to make French agriculture a paying proposition, holding its right place, neither more nor less, in the economic activity of the country. In the current discussion of the problem almost always one or the other of two extreme positions is taken. While the agrarians defend the *status quo* and in particular (for that is the nub of the debate) the maintenance of protectionist measures, the liberals turn their eyes towards England and admit, at least implicitly, that there is no other adjustment possible for the agricultural revolution than the one which took place in the British Isles in the 19th century. From this they conclude that French agricultural production and population must be reduced to the bare minimum and that in order to achieve this aim, the suppression of agricultural protectionism is necessary and sufficient. Our conviction is that neither the one nor the other of these positions represents a rational agricultural policy taking into account all the exigencies of the French situation....

Until now we have accepted the position that the food autonomy of France had to be maintained. It is clear that this necessity will disappear as soon as a system of collective security has been established and proved. The only condition which must then be satisfied by French agricultural policy is that of maximum productivity of the national

soil, in all branches and activities. If population is not to be increased by large scale exterior contributions, the division of manpower which would then be found necessary in France would probably be analogous to that found at present in the United Kingdom. The considerable natural advantages which France enjoys from the industrial point of view predestines her, now that the handicap of coal can be surmounted, to become a great manufacturing country. Under this hypothesis, the agricultural population would be reduced considerably, but what would be left would enjoy a very high standard of living. North Africa with its much more favorable natural conditions than the Metropolis could constitute the agricultural appendage of an industrialized Metropolis. Wheat growing in particular could be greatly developed.

If, on the contrary, the mobility of foreign manpower allows us to envisage the possibility of a considerable increase in the French population (the population movements would probably consist of a flow from Southern and Eastern Europe to Western Europe), the situation is presented in a very different fashion. It would then become rational to develop simultaneously in France industry and agriculture, the latter based on stock raising, so that the standard of living should be as high as possible.

—"The Future of French Agriculture" (French), *La France Libre*, London, February 15, 1943, p. 293, 302.

## 13. PROGRAM FOR THE RESCUE OF JEWS FROM NAZI OCCUPIED EUROPE

The systematic mass extermination of Jews in Nazi-occupied territories as a program of German state action was

revealed as early as September, 1942. The authenticity of the extermination program was established by the directed in-

vestigations of consular agents of the United Nations in neutral lands.

By the end of 1942, it was estimated that more than two million Jews had been killed. The extermination program of the Nazis was achieved through mass deportations in caravans, where the victims died of suffocation or starvation; through extermination centers where the victims died of asphyxiation by gas in gas chambers; by fumes from sulphur mines; by carbon monoxide from army trucks; through mass cremation; through mass machine gunning; through planned starvation.

Five months ago, in response to the appeals of an aroused humanity, to which the voices of great leaders of religious thought and statesmen of vision gave their support, the United Nations issued a denunciation of the Nazi policy of mass murder, and pledged themselves to take practical measures. Since that declaration was issued, months have passed, and its implementation has yet to be achieved.

But the holocaust of murder continues unabated. As the failure of Total War is driven home to Nazi leadership, the frustration of their hope of world conquest turns them in fury to the murder of all Jews who are helpless in their grasp. In addition to the Jews who already have been done to death, total extermination threatens all those who remain in Nazi-occupied Europe.

Our deepest sympathy goes out to all peoples suffering from the hardships of Total War, and especially to those peoples of all denominations suffering under the heel of the Nazi oppressors. But it is our duty to point out that of all the peoples who have suffered and are suffering under the oppression of the Nazi aggressors, the Jews are the only people who have been singled out and marked for total extermination by Nazi Germany.

The daily accounts of mass murders accumulate in all their heartrending details. These accounts have shaken the Jewish community to its depths.

Those who linger in helpless captivity, awaiting the dreadful call for departure to ghetto or concentration camp where death awaits them, are thrown into the depths of unutterable despair by the thought that they are regarded as merely the wasteage of a cruel world, that they are unclaimed and unwanted, that their kinsmen from afar are unable to aid

them, and that there seems to be no shadow of hope for them anywhere.

The threat of retribution after the war and the exorcism of their horrible deeds have not served to turn the Nazi leaders from their determined policy of mass murder. The condemnation of the civilized world has not arrested the mounting tragedy. It is submitted, therefore, that the United Nations cannot afford to close their eyes to this appalling situation.

So far as is known, the United Nations have as yet taken no decisive action to rescue as many of the victims marked for death as could be saved. Public opinion is far ahead of Government decision. The moral indignation of great American communities, of their religious and labor leaders, was climaxed by an appeal for action by the United Nations on March 1, 1943, in New York, at a mass demonstration.

At this meeting, a detailed program of rescue was submitted and approved and forwarded to the Government of the United States. What was registered at the meeting on March 1st was endorsed by similar demonstrations which followed in other cities. The American press and assemblies of Christian religious organizations have joined in the demand upon the Government for action. Elsewhere throughout the democratic world the public clamors for immediate action.

The Bermuda Conference was in a measure prompted by all these public manifestations of humanitarian interest. It is submitted, therefore, that it becomes the duty of the United Nations to turn to a planned program of determined action, looking toward the release of a substantial number of Jews from Nazi Germany, the creation of Sanctuaries for them in Allied and neutral countries, and the feeding under appropriate guarantees of those who are compelled to remain imprisoned within Nazi-occupied countries.

In the belief that it may contribute to such a program, the following proposals are respectfully submitted:

1. The United Nations should approach the German Government, and the governments of the states it now partly dominates or controls, through the Vatican or neutral governments like Switzerland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Argentine, with a view to securing their agreement to the release of their Jewish victims and to the emigration of Jews to such havens of refuge as may be provided.

II. The United Nations should, without delay, take steps to designate and establish a number of Sanctuaries in Allied and neutral countries to accommodate substantial numbers of Hitler's victims and to serve as havens of refuge for those Jews whose release from captivity may be arranged for, or who may find their way to freedom through efforts of their own.

III. The procedure that now prevails in the administration of the existing immigration law in the United States, which acts as a deterrent and retardation of legal immigration under the established quotas, should be revised and adjusted to war conditions, in order that refugees from Nazi-occupied territories, within such quotas, may find Sanctuary here.

IV. Subject to provisions for its national security, England should be asked to provide for receiving a reasonable number of victims escaping from Nazi-occupied territories and to provide for their accommodation for the duration.

V. The possibilities in several British territories, both in Africa and in the Caribbean, should be explored without delay. Sanctuary has already been afforded to thousands of refugees in these territories and there is room for many more, if not for permanent settlement, at least for the duration.

VI. The United Nations should urge the Republics of Latin America to modify such administrative regulations that now make immigration under the law extremely difficult, and to endeavor to find temporary havens of refuge for a substantial number of refugees.

VII. Overriding pre-war political considerations, England should be persuaded to open the doors of Palestine for Jewish immigration and the offer of hospitality made by the Jewish Community of Palestine should be accepted.

VIII. The United Nations should provide financial guarantees to all such neutral states as have given temporary refuge to Jews coming from Nazi-occupied territories and to provide for their feeding and maintenance and eventual evacuation. The neutral states should be guaranteed that the refugees will not become a public charge and that they will

be transferred to permanent Sanctuaries as soon as possible.

IX. In order to do away with the lack of identity which many stateless refugees present, and to give them sponsorship and protection, an arrangement similar to that which existed under the League of Nations should be established and the Stateless refugees should be given identification passports analogous to the "Nansen" passports.

X. In view of the fact that mass starvation is the design of the Nazi regime, the United Nations should take appropriate steps without delay to organize a system for the feeding of the victims of Nazi oppression who are unable to leave the jurisdiction and the control of the Axis.

XI. It is submitted that the United Nations undertake to provide the financial guarantees that may be required for the execution of the program of rescue here outlined.

XII. The United Nations are urged to establish an appropriate intergovernmental agency, to which full authority and power should be given to implement the program of rescue here outlined.

In support of these proposals an appendix is attached.

In the name of humanity and of the ideals which the Armed Forces of the United Nations have arisen to defend, we respectfully submit this appeal in the hope that effective action will be taken without delay.

JOINT EMERGENCY COMMITTEE  
FOR EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS  
of

American Jewish Congress  
B'nai B'rith

American Emergency Committee for  
Zionist Affairs

Agudath Israel of America, Inc.

American Jewish Committee  
Jewish Labor Committee

Synagogue Council of America  
Union of Orthodox Rabbis of

America

*—Program for the Rescue of Jews from  
Nazi Occupied Europe Submitted to the  
Bermuda Conference by the Joint Emer-  
gency Committee for European Jewish  
Affairs. . . [New York], April 14, 1943.  
pp. 1-4.*

## 14. BERMUDA CONFERENCE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The United States and United Kingdom delegates examined the refugee problem in all its aspects including the position of those potential refugees who are still

in the grip of the Axis powers without any immediate prospect of escape. Nothing was excluded from their analysis and everything that held out any possibility,

however remote, of a solution of the problem was carefully investigated and thoroughly discussed. From the outset it was realized that any recommendation that the delegates could make to their governments must pass two tests: Would any recommendation submitted interfere with or delay the war effort of the United Nations and was the recommendation capable of accomplishment under war conditions? The delegates at Bermuda felt bound to reject certain proposals which were not capable of meeting these tests. The delegates were able to agree on a number of concrete recommendations which they are jointly submitting to their governments and which, it is felt, will pass the tests set forth above and will lead to the relief of a substantial number of refugees of all races and nationalities. Since the recommendations necessarily concern governments other than those rep-

resented at the Bermuda conference and involve military considerations, they must remain confidential. It may be said, however, that in the course of discussion the refugee problem was broken down into its main elements. Questions of shipping, food, and supply were fully investigated. The delegates also agreed on recommendations regarding the form of intergovernmental organization which was best fitted, in their opinion, to handle the problem in the future. This organization would have to be flexible enough to permit it to consider without prejudice any new factors that might come to its attention. In each of these fields the delegates were able to submit agreed proposals for consideration of their respective governments.

---

—*Department of State Bulletin*, May 1, 1943.

## 15. REFUGEE AND IMMIGRATION STATISTICS GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

By ILJA DIJOUR

The Bermuda Conference was held behind closed doors. The decisions arrived at are not yet known; they will probably not be announced at all because the Governments of the U.S. and Great Britain feel that making the decisions public may interfere with the successful prosecution of the war. Consequently, we are told, there is no way of criticizing the proceedings and results of the conference. Two official documents, however, which constituted the points of departure of the Bermuda Conference, were made public, and we can, indeed, if we must, analyze them.

These two documents are a statement submitted by the British Government to the Government of the United States, and a note from the U.S. Department of State to the British Government.

On January 20th, 1943, the British Government submitted to the U.S. Department of State an aide-mémoire relative to the refugee problem. The British Information Service in Washington revealed the substance of this document on March 4th, 1943.

... The aide-mémoire listed at some length what Great Britain and her colonies are doing for the refugees already. Great Britain herself, in spite of a prevailing stringency of food and housing under war conditions, is accommodating, besides Allied forces

and merchant seamen, nearly 100,000 refugees, while the contribution of some of the Colonies is given as follows: Jamaica maintains an additional population of over 3,000, more than half of whom come from Gibraltar; Mauritius has taken 1,500 emigrants from Palestine and 1,000 Greek refugees; Cyprus has given hospitality to an additional population of 4,830, nearly all from Greece; the East African Colonies with a European population of 30,000, are finding accommodation for no less than 90,000 refugees, including 21,000 Polish refugees from Persia.

In addition Palestine received 18,000 legal immigrants between April 1939 and September 1942, while information has just come through that 4,000 Jewish children and 500 adults are to leave Bulgaria for Palestine. The British Government has in addition undertaken to receive in Palestine, if the necessary arrangements can be made, up to 29,000 Jewish children with a proportion of adults, by March 31, 1944. . . .

How large is the number of refugees in Great Britain? The *London Times* on June 14th, 1939, published a letter by Sir Samuel Hoare, then Home Secretary, in which he stated that England had admitted 29,000 refugees since 1933 and that 3,873 of them had, as of April 1939, left the country. This means that Britain at that time sheltered 25,127 refugees.

From January 1 till June, 1939, Britain authorized the admission of 25,244 persons, who included:

7,170 for domestic service  
2,184 over 60 years of age  
10,000 transients  
5,060 children  
300 physicians  
450 nurses  
80 midwives

Sir John Hope Simpson, in a report from which these figures are taken, uses the expression "authorized for admission," which can mean only that not all of those authorized actually entered the country. To our knowledge, no other reliable reports on the number of refugees in England have been published since. Is it conceivable that England admitted almost 75,000 refugees from Nazi-dominated countries from April, 1939 till January, 1943? Or, perhaps, are the evacuees from the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Malta, etc. included in the "nearly 100,000" mentioned in the British aide-memoire? (Evacuees are sometimes called "refugees" in British usage.)

In the *New York Times* of May 20th, 1943, there is a report concerning the House of Commons session of the preceding day. Mr. Osbert Peake, parliamentary under-secretary of the Home Office, who had attended the Bermuda Conference, reported to the House that 63,000 refugees, "excluding British refugees from the Channel Islands, Gibraltar and elsewhere" were admitted by Great Britain from 1940 to 1942. The expression "excluding" seems very definitely to imply that England has since 1933 admitted about 75,000 non-British victims of the Nazis. H. N. Brailsford, the well-known English journalist however had this to say about Mr. Peake's statement in *Reynold's News*, as reported in the Jewish Telegraph Agency bulletin of May 25th: "Most of these men were Dutch and Norwegian seamen and other members of the Allied forces." If so, this would seem to be the picture: the sum total of 100,000 refugees referred to in the British aide-memoire did not include the Allied armed forces, but did comprise the people from Gibraltar, Malta, etc., all "refugees" in a technical sense. On the contrary, the statement concerning 63,000 refugees in 1943 explicitly speaks of *non-English* refugees, but fails to mention that the armed forces have been included.

It is too bold to suggest that the British Government issue a statement about the exact number of civilian non-

English refugees from Nazi-dominated countries in Britain? We shall then know what has actually been done in behalf of these victims and we shall not have to grope in the dark.

More accurate information is available as to the number of refugees in Jamaica. The statement in the British aide-memoire that "more than half" of the 3,000 refugees in Jamaica "come from Gibraltar" is an understatement. Actually, Jamaica has only 300 refugees, 150 Polish and 150 Dutch citizens; the other 2,700 are residents of Gibraltar whom the British Government has for one reason or another preferred to evacuate. How can they be included among the refugees from Nazi-dominated countries?

As for Mauritius, it could not admit 1,500 emigrants from Palestine for the simple reason that the war, fortunately, did not touch Palestine, and did not lead to any emigration from that country. It would have been more correct to say that the 1,500 persons referred to were immigrants on their way to Palestine, who, however, were not admitted there. This was followed by the "Struma" incident, still fresh in our memory.

The statement about the 90,000 refugees in the *East African Colonies* is not clear at all. Inasmuch as 21,000 Polish refugees from Persia are included in the 90,000, it may be assumed that a large number of them are really Polish soldiers and their families evacuated from Russia.

The 4,000 Jewish children and 500 adults from Bulgaria have never left that country. To be sure, that is not Britain's fault; but there was no reason in January for adding them in advance to the number of rescued refugees.

The same applies to the statement that Palestine is to receive "in addition . . . 29,000 Jewish children with a proportion of adults by March 31, 1944." To begin with, they have not yet been admitted; secondly, their admission is contingent on certain "necessary arrangements." Moreover, 29,000 is simply the number of Jewish immigrants which Palestine is to admit according to the terms set forth in the White Paper, and we wonder why these prospective newcomers to Palestine should be mentioned as further evidence of Britain's endeavours in behalf of the Nazi victims.

The following is the text of the U.S. note to the British Government. Made public on March 3rd, 1943, it reads:

. . . 5. As shown by the records of the Department of State, from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis powers, the great majority of which persons were refugees from Nazi persecution. Of this number 228,964 were issued in the war years 1939-1942. Many more than that number of visas were authorized during this latter period, the aliens in whose behalf such authorizations were given having been unable to depart from their places of foreign residence to reach the United States. Yet, of the number actually issued, practically all of the aliens who received them during the war years 1939-1942 have actually arrived in the United States and have remained here, many of them having entered in a temporary status and not yet having departed. . . .

Twice the note emphasizes that the U.S. Government is and must be bound by the present immigration laws of the country. Why are these laws so immutable? It goes without saying that the executive cannot change the immigration laws; as a matter of fact; no one expects it to do so. But Congress, which enacts laws, can also change them; within recent years it has enacted many fundamental innovations designed to meet the newly created world situation. If the U.S. can spend billions for the purpose of arming, feeding and clothing whole populations in remote countries, why so utterly deny the possibility of some change in American immigration policy?

Let us, however, see what the U.S. has actually done, within the limits of the quota laws of 1924, since Hitler has been in power and since the spread of Nazism to some of the countries adjacent to Germany. The following table, based of course on official reports, shows how the immigration laws have been executed.

Country	Quota	Annual		Number of persons actually admitted					
		1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	
Germany	25,957	1,324	3,515	4,891	6,073	11,127			
Austria	1,413	121	229	641	569	409	17,868		32,759
Poland	6,524	961	1,138	1,682	1,250	1,855	4,218	6,512	
Rumania	295	236	199	295	282	371	407	499	
Lithuania	386	96	124	190	451	221	397	365	
Latvia	236	29	48	49	60	114	154	223	
		1940	1941	1942					
Germany & Austria	26,083	15,051	4,883						
Poland	4,354	4,406	2,203						
Rumania	469	286	282						
Lithuania	294	232	126						
Latvia	184	171	105						

These figures show that only since 1938 may we perhaps speak of the immigration laws as having been applied "in the utmost liberal and humane spirit."

We do not know whether the number of American visas granted to German or Austrian citizens in the years prior to 1938 equalled the number of applicants. We are certain, however, that the number of applicants for American visas in Poland exceeded the annual quota. Poland had an annual quota of 6,524 and only 6,886 immigrants were admitted in the years 1933-1937, or only 21% of the 32,620 of Poland's quota for this five-year period. Economic or political reasons may be found. We may prefer not to explain it by discretion in the hands of the consuls. But is this an illustration of the application of the immigration laws "in the

utmost liberal and humane spirit?" It is further stated that "from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular offices to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis powers." We may wonder how visas issued to French, Dutch, Belgian, Danish, Norwegian, Finnish, Yugoslav or Greek natives prior to the outbreak of the war can be regarded as help to Axis victims. Even the pre-war immigrants from Poland, the Baltic countries and from Rumania cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as "refugees from Nazi persecution."

In view of all this, how many visas were actually issued to real refugees from Nazi persecution?

There is, however, another question, one. How many of the persons who were granted visas actually arrived in the United States?

The statement that "many more . . . visas were authorized" at first sight implies that the number mentioned in the note refers to the number of persons actually admitted. But according to the reports of the U.S. Immigration Service, only 453,205 immigrants were actually admitted in the years 1933-1942, almost 100,000 less than the number of visas indicated in the note.

Nor is this all. Only 291,112 of the 453,205 actually admitted were from Europe. The others (162,093) came from Canada, Mexico and other non-European countries. Furthermore, although it is stated in the note that 547,775 visas were issued to natives or nationals of countries "now dominated by the Axis powers," the actual number admitted from such countries was only 243,420. Even if we assume that all of these 243,420 immigrants were Nazi-victims it is nevertheless difficult to see how it can be said that "the great majority" of the 547,775 to receive visas "were refugees from Nazi persecution." Be it remarked, by the way, that 163,423 of those admitted in the years 1933-1942 were Jews.

The note goes on to say that 228,964 visas were issued in the years 1939-1942. According to the official reports, only 151,313 were actually admitted, and not more than 81,843 of them were from Nazi-dominated countries. Again, 71,290 of the total number of immigrants from Europe, and about 60,000 of the total from Nazi-occupied countries, were Jews.

The picture will remain essentially the same if we include refugees with temporary visas. To begin with, those of them admitted in the years 1933-1939 had to leave the country. As to the visitors and other holders of temporary visas who remained here after September, 1939, and

who were granted immigration visas, they are included in the total number of the immigrants.

How many visitors and other holders of temporary visas are at present in this country? We do not know the exact number, because the reports published do not cover the entire period under consideration. From an official report, however, we do know that 4,862 of the total number of temporary visitors from Europe admitted in the year ending June 30th, 1941, came "for business" and 10,478 "for pleasure." 2,979 of the former and 6,215 of the latter group were from Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden. If we assume that all the other Europeans with temporary visas admitted in the same year were Nazi-victims, and that none of them returned, then we have only 1,883 admitted "for business" and 4,263 "for pleasure."

Of the total number of temporary visitors from Europe admitted in the year ending June 30th, 1942, 2,628 came "for business" and 4,679 "for pleasure." 1,513 of the former and 3,422 of the latter group came from Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden. If we assume, as before, that all the other Europeans with temporary visas admitted in the year ending June 30, 1942, were Nazi-victims and that all of them remained, then we have only 1,115 and 1,157 respectively, a total of only 2,272.

It is true that some aliens in behalf of whom authorization for visas were given were "unable to depart from their places of foreign residence." But we regret to say that we know of some cases in which American consuls refused to issue visas authorized by the State Department. . . .

---

"The Preparation for the Bermuda Conference," *Yivo Bleter*, February, 1943, pp. 5-19.

## 16. AN ESTIMATE OF FINANCES REQUIRED FOR JEWISH RELIEF

By A. MENES

How large are the material damages suffered by the Jewish populations of Europe? To date, it has not been possible to evolve any dependable figures. It is possible, however, to create an approximate picture of the assets owned by Jews at the outbreak of the war. In 1938,

the Nazi government appraised the wealth of the Jews in Germany and Austria at 2½ billion dollars. Perhaps this was already an exaggeration. But the tax statistics of the Jewish communities in Germany indicate that before Hitler's coming to power the wealth of the

German Jewish population averaged no less than \$3,000 per capita. The Jews of Holland certainly did not have a lower rating than those of Germany. For France, Belgium, Austria, and Bohemia (where there were large numbers of Jewish workers and small traders who had migrated from Eastern Europe), an average of \$1,200 to \$1,500 per capita may be assumed. This would bring the total wealth of Jews in Western Europe to approximately 3 billion dollars. For Eastern Europe, the average per capita wealth for the urban population may be accepted; at about \$400. The total for 7 million East European Jews would therefore be \$2,800,000,000.

It may be assumed that the Nazis destroyed or confiscated a minimum of 75% to 80% of the Jewish wealth, which would bring the material loss to about \$4,500,000,000. This figure is actually too low. The real loss was unquestionably greater. The Nazis deprived the Jews not only of their businesses, factories and homes, but of all their valuables and sometimes even of their last bit of clothing....

It would seem that to supply Europe with essential raw materials, food and machinery for the first five years after the war, credits totaling between \$25 and \$30 billion will be required, or between \$5 and \$6 billion a year. The needs of the Jewish population will probably total between \$200 and \$250 million a year. Medical aid, food and clothing for the Jews of Eastern Europe will demand about \$100 million annually for the first two or three years. How can these colossal funds be raised?

After the First World War, European Jews depended mostly on aid from the Jewish communities in the United States. The brotherly help given by the Jewish communities in the United States to the Jews on the other side of the ocean constitutes one of the most beautiful chapters in Jewish history, whose record of solidarity in matters of succor is rich. In 1919-1920, the Joint Distribution Committee alone distributed \$22,350,000. During the same period, between five and six million dollars were distributed by other organizations, mostly by Landsmannschaften. The total amount of aid, therefore, which was transmitted by Jewish organizations in the United States to Europe in 1919-1920 was about \$14,000,000 annually. Later, the sums distributed by the Joint Distribution Committee dropped considerably. Between

1919 and 1939, Jewish relief organizations in the United States sent about \$120,000,000 overseas. Of this sum, the J.D.C. transmitted almost \$100,000,000.

Even in 1919-1920, the support received by the 7,000,000 Jews of Europe from the Jewish Organizations in the United States, averaged only about \$2.00 a year or 4c. a week per person. Naturally, the relief money was not distributed to every member of the population; the actual aid obtained by the most needy amounted to a great deal more than the figures given above. American aid maintained almost all the important social welfare institutions, such as hospitals, orphan asylums and children's homes. The majority of the Jewish population in Europe supported itself even during the worst years of the war and after it. American aid, however, was exceedingly important because of what it accomplished at moments of crisis. A poor artisan would often literally be saved by the few dollars which enabled him to buy a machine. A network of credit cooperatives was also set up with subventions from the J.D.C.; these cooperatives eventually accumulated substantial capital of their own, by far exceeding the original allotments from the J.D.C.

Even more significant was the aid which European Jews obtained from their relatives in the United States. Unfortunately no accurate figures are available here. Only a small percentage utilized the money- and package-transmission services offered by the J.D.C., the HIAS and other Jewish organizations. Indirect methods must therefore be resorted to in trying to ascertain the assistance received from relatives in America between 1919 and 1929.

General approximations of the money forwarded by those who had immigrated to America include those taken back to Europe by people re-emigrating to their original countries. Official and private data are also available for some European countries, covering the amount of money received there. According to all these approximations, about four to six hundred million dollars was transmitted annually from the United States between 1919 and 1921. The imposition of immigration restrictions brought about a noticeable decline in the amount of money sent over. In 1923, immigrants transmitted about \$275,000,000. In 1933, a year of economic crisis, about \$110,000,000 was sent across. In 1936, the total rose once more to \$172,000,000. The last year of peace, 1938, saw a reduction to \$150,000,000.

Added to these sums were the significant amounts transmitted by individual relatives of Europeans from Canada (18.7 million dollars in 1925) and Argentina (28.5 million dollars in 1925).

What percentage of these funds came from Jewish immigrants? Between 1900 and 1920, Jews comprised more than 10% of the total immigration to the United States. It is to be assumed that Jews participated equally in maintaining a bond with their relatives abroad. Of course, not many Jews belonged to the class of immigrants who came to the United States to earn some money and then to return with it to the old country. This was compensated for, however, by the fact that the Jews, remaining in the United States, were able to support their relatives for a longer period of time. The total participation of the Jews in the transmission of funds was therefore about 10%, which assumption would produce the following figures: from 1919-1921, 40 to 60 million dollars annually; from 1923-1929, 20 to 30 million dollars annually; from 1930-1938, 12 to 17 million dollars annually. To this must be added the sums that reached Europe from Jewish immigrants in Canada, South Africa and South America. European Jews, therefore, probably received more than \$500,000,000 from their relatives overseas between 1919 and 1939. Subventions provided by the major Jewish relief organizations, constituted only 20% of the aid from communities in America.

Between 1919 and 1921, an annual average of 50 to 70 million dollars was received by European Jews from overseas. Between 30% and 40% of European Jewish families may therefore be assumed to have depended for a good part of their budget on private and social welfare assistance from America, during the first three years after the First World War. In the 1930's, aid from the United States (including remittances by relatives) made up no more than 3% or 4% of the incomes of the Jewish population in the European countries.

The destruction of the Jewish communities in present-day Europe is incomparably greater than that of the Jewish communities in Russia, Poland, and other East European countries after the First World War. It has already been shown that to cover the most pressing needs after this war, between 200 and 250 million dollars will be needed annually. The large Jewish relief organizations will not be able to provide more than 10 or 15 million dollars a year. Remittances from relatives will certainly be much less than after the First

World War, for a very simple reason. In 1919-1920, the greater part of the Jewish immigrants to the United States consisted of young people who had recently left their homelands. Their parents, brothers, sisters and comrades, remained in the old country, . . . During the past 25 years, the immigrant group in the United States has grown much older. There are fewer contacts left on the other side, and less communication between them. Frequently no one is left to write to. . . . The number of immigrants of even the older generation is growing smaller; the younger generation has little knowledge of their distant relatives abroad or interest in them. It is therefore the duty of Jewish organizations to seek to maintain a bond between the Jews of the United States and the Jews of Europe. This is not only important in regard to relief for Europe, which is important enough, but it has great cultural and moral significance for the Jews of the United States. Even today, the root of Jewish cultural existence lies in Eastern Europe, and it is to be hoped that the Jews of that part of the world will continue to be the pioneers of Jewish cultural creativity.

We must not forget, however, that remittances from relatives will be much smaller after this war than after the First World War. If the total of Jewish relief money, including both privately remitted funds and welfare funds, reaches 25 to 35 million dollars a year, the accomplishment will be great indeed. Yet only 15% of the requirements for financing relief and reconstruction in the ravaged Jewish communities of Europe will thus be provided. This fact cannot be realized too soon. Jewish relief will not be able to play as important a role as it did after the First World War. Moreover, the relief requirements of the general population will by far exceed the alleviating powers of voluntary private organizations. The colossal financial needs required by reconstruction will be obtainable only through direct subsidies allotted by governments, or through credits guaranteed by governments; chiefly of course, by the United States. Jewish relief organizations will have to become part of the intergovernmental agencies to be created for this purpose; their duty will be to protect the interests of the Jewish population and to assure a just and effective use of the funds.

—“Problems of Economic Reconstruction,” *Jude nach der Milkhome* (Jews After the War), New York, Research Committee of the Jewish Labor Committee, 1942, pp. 19-39. By permission of the publishers.

## 17. REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY

### (a) BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND SOURCE MATERIAL

The references and bibliographies in Unit I (pp. 30-32) and Unit V (pp. 59-60) will be found to be very helpful for the purposes of this Unit.

*Administration of Relief Abroad*. New York, Russel Sage Foundation (130 E. 22 St., N.Y.C.), 1943, 23p.

—A comprehensive bibliography on civilian relief and rehabilitation.

The Preliminary Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace includes articles on Social Justice Within and Among Nations, by Katherine F. Lenroot; Economic Justice Among Nations, by Eugene Staley; Anti-depression Policy in Sound International Relations, by Alvin H. Hansen; International Financial Organization, by Walter Lichtenstein; Unemployment and War, by Spencer Miller, Jr.; Population Factors Relating to the Organization of Peace, by Frank Lorimer, etc.

The Second Report—*The Transitional Period* (also published as No. 379 of *International Conciliation*, April 1942) of the Commission has papers on the Economic Aftermath of the War, by Eugene Staley; Problems Relating to Migration and Settlement, by Frank Lorimer, Katherine F. Lenroot and E. J. Coil; Colonial Aspects of the Postwar Settlement, by Benjamin Gerig and Others, etc.

The Commission's Third Report—*The United Nations and the Organization of Peace*, (also published as No. 389 of *International Conciliation*, April 1943) includes a Study of Occupation Problems, by Benjamin Akzin; Relief and Reconstruction, by Clarence E. Pickett and Spencer Coxe; Uprooted Jews in the Immediate Postwar World, by Jacob Robinson; Social Reconstruction by Carter Goodrich; Problems of Economic Reorganization, by J. B. Condliffe, etc.

Information for obtaining these publications and their prices will be found in Unit V, p. 60.

The May 1939 issue of *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science is entirely given over to "Refugees." It includes articles on The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem, by Louise W. Holborn; A Homeland for Refugees, by David H. Popper; Refugees and an Underdeveloped Economy, by C. Hartley Grattan; Refugee

Settlement in Latin America, by Samuel Guy Inman, etc.

The July 1943 issue of *The Annals* is concerned with "The United Nations and the Future." It has articles on East Central Europe in Postwar Organization, by Oskar Halecki; Mechanisms of Postwar Planning, by J. B. Condliffe; Foreign Trade Reconstruction, by Alexander V. Dye, etc.

*World Economics*, the Bulletin of the Institute of World Economics, gave over much of its first issue (Vol. 1, Nos. 1-2, January 1943) to "Post-War Population Resettlements." It has papers on Population Dislocations in Europe, by Irene B. Taeuber; Attitudes Towards Settlement in Latin America, by J. F. Norman; Migration Problems in Australia, by Edmund de S. Brunner; Industrial and Settlement Possibilities in British Guiana, by Emile C. Bataille; Planned Migration and the International Labour Office, by E. M. Kuhnscher, etc.

*New Europe* of May 1943 is entirely given over to a discussion of the "Approach to Relief." Among others, it includes articles on Relief and Reconstruction in Western Europe, by Spencer Coxe; Europe's Contribution to European Relief, by Ernest Schnabel; The Need for an International Health Organization, by J. Heng Liu, etc.

### (b) STUDY GUIDES

The bibliography under this heading in Unit V lists material relevant to the present Unit. In addition, the following material is recommended, especially for group leaders.

*Freedom From Want. A World Goal*. Elizabeth E. Hoyt, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 80, New York, Public Affairs Committee, Inc., (30 Rockefeller Place, N.Y.C.) 1943, 31 pp. 10c.

—A presentation, with maps and graphs, of the need to eradicate hunger, disease and illiteracy throughout the world.

*Rebuilding Europe—After Victory*. Hiram Motherwell, Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 81, 1943, 32 pp. 10c.

—A graphic presentation.

*Economic Problems of the Post-War World. Democratic Planning for Full*

*Employment.* Alvin H. Hansen and Lawrence E. Leamer. Problems in American Life: Unit No. 10. Washington, D. C. National Education Association, (1201 Sixteenth Street, N.W.) 1942. 64 pp. 30c.

—Issued under the auspices of the N.E.A.'s National Association of Secondary-School Principals and National Council for the Social Studies. Analysis by the noted economist, Professor Hansen, is followed by Mr. Seamer's teaching aids.

*Economic Requisites of a Durable Peace.* Stuart Chase, Mordecai Ezekiel and T. O. Yntema. Chicago, Ill., The University of Chicago Round Table No. 231. (The University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.) 1942. 27 pp. 10c.

—Unit III in the Series on the Post-War World. This radio discussion is supplemented by visual aids and a selected bibliography.

#### (c) RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

*A Survey of Literature on Postwar Reconstruction.* Prepared by Adolf Sturthal, New York University Institute on Postwar Reconstruction. (Washington Square, N.Y.C.), May 1943. 100 pp. \$1.00.

—Number 1 in the Institute's Series of Publications. A strong economic emphasis, with much reference to expert thinking.

*Post-War Agenda,* National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D.C., November 1942. Free.

—Domestic plans for Full Employment, Security and Building America.

"Relief and Rehabilitation," Herbert H. Lehman, *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 15, 1943.

—Includes the text of the agreement for a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; introductory note by Winifred N. Hadsel.

*Relief for Europe: The First Phase of Reconstruction.* National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 17 (800 21st St., N.W., Washington, D.C.), December 1942. 59 pp. 25c.

—A well balanced discussion.

*Relief and Reconstruction in Europe: The First Steps,* Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, July 1942. 44 pp.

—The views of an influential British body.

*The Transition from War to Peace Economy,* Report of the Delegation on Economic Depressions, Part I. League of Nations, Geneva. 1943. (Princeton, N.J.) 118 pp.

—An economic discussion.

"We'll Have to Feed the World Again," Herbert Hoover, *Collier's Weekly*, November 28 and December 5, 1942.

—By the man who directed American relief activities in Europe after World War I.

"U.S. Relief for Europe in World War I," Winifred N. Hadsel, *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 15, 1943.

—A history, followed by a page on "U.S. Plans for Food Relief in World War II," by One K. D. Ringwood and Mrs. Hadsel.

"Post-War Relief and Reconstruction," Clarence E. Pickett, *Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, September 1942.

—The need for preparation now.

"Personnel for Postwar Needs," Bernard D. Weinryb, *Congress Weekly*, May 28, 1943.

—The need for relief personnel with a Jewish background.

"Twenty-five Years of American Aid to Jews Overseas," Joseph C. Hyman, American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 41, 1939-40—5700, pp. 141-180. Also available in reprint form from the J.D.C.

—By the executive vice-chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee.

"Economic Reconstruction of European Jewry," Arieh Tarakower, *Jewish Frontier*, April 1943.

—A brief summary of problems.

"Uprooted Jews in the Immediate Post-war World," Jacob Robinson, *Third Report—the United Nations and the Organization of Peace* of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, New York, April, 1943. Also published as No. 389 of *International Conciliation*, April, 1943.

—A more detailed summary of problems.

#### (d) MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

*Jewish Migrations, Past Experiences and Post-War Prospects.* Eugene M. Ku-

lischer. Number 4 in the Pamphlet Series on Jews and the Post-War World. Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of The American Jewish Committee. (386 Fourth Ave., N.Y.C.) 1943. 51 pp. 20c.

—A historical survey pointed to the future.

"Europe's Migrating Millions," Martin H. Schwartz, *Free World*, March 1943.

—A survey of the problems created by the war.

"A Blueprint for Immigration," Nahum Goldman, *New Palestine*, November 6, 1942.

—A Zionist view.

*World Immigration*. Maurice R. Davie. New York, 1939. 588 pp.

—A general study, with special reference to the United States.

*Limits of Land Settlement*. Isaiah Bowman, editor. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937. 380 pp.

—Specialized studies on the principal undeveloped areas of the world.

*White Settlers in the Tropics*. Archibald Grenfell Price. New York, American Geographical Society of New York, 1939. 311 pp.

—A detailed scientific study.

*Refugee Settlement in the Dominican Republic*. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1942. 410 pp.

—A study of the Sosua experience.

"Mirage of Refugee Resettlement," David A. Popper, *Survey Graphic*, January 1939.

—A pessimistic view.

"Can Europe's Refugees Find New Homes?", Winifred N. Hadsel, *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 1, 1943.

—An evaluation of tendencies.

"Projects for Jewish Mass Colonization," The Institute of Jewish Affairs. *Jewish Affairs*, November 1941.

—An analysis of proposals for settlement in Africa, North and South America, Asia and Australia.

"Transfer of Populations," Bernard Newman, *Free Europe*, London, March 13, 1942.

—Transfer is envisaged as an important means of easing national tensions.

"Jewish Territorialism. An Historical Sketch," Abraham G. Duker, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, March-April 1939.

—A history of territorialist efforts.

"The Youngest Pioneers," Marian G. Greeberg, *Survey Graphic*, March 1940.

—A history and social analysis of the Youth Aliyah.

"Agriculture in Palestine and the Development of Jewish Colonization," N. W. Hazen, *Foreign Agriculture*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 1937.

—The Palestine experience, with implicit lessons for activity elsewhere.

"Kevutzoth in America," Edward Norman, *New Palestine*, June 20, 1941.

—The author believes that the Palestinian model can serve for settlements even in this country.

#### (e) REFUGEES

"The Jewish Emigrant—1941," Max Gottschalk, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, June 1941.

—The European situation from 1933 to 1941. Concrete information on routes of escape, organizations, etc.

"People in Flight: The German Refugees at the Outbreak of the War," Harold J. Jonas, *Contemporary Jewish Record*, September 1939.

—A popular summary.

"The Jewish Refugees, a Sociological Survey," Arieh Tartakower, *Jewish Social Studies*, October 1942.

—A statistical analysis.

"Jewish Emigration from Germany, 1933-38," Mark Wischnitzer, *Jewish Social Studies*, January 1940.

—Countries of immigration.

"Refugees: Burden or Asset?" Kurt Grossman, *The Nation*, December 21, 1942.

—An analytic demonstration of their constructive role in our economy.

See also *The Annals*, May 1939, listed under (a).

#### (f) PERIODICALS

The reader is referred to the list of general and Jewish periodicals in Unit V, pp. 63-64. The following are more specialized.

*J.D.C. Digest*, a monthly published by American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 100 East 42nd Street, N.Y.C.

*American OSE Review*, a monthly published by the American Committee for Protection of the Health of the Jews—OSE, 24 West 40th Street, N.Y.C.

*ORT Economic Review*, published bimonthly by ORT Economic Research Committee, 212 Fifth Avenue, N.Y.C.

*Rescue News*, issued periodically by Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), 425-437 Lafayette Street, N.Y.C.

#### (g) OTHER SOURCES

A list of Jewish Organizations Actively Interested in Post-War Problems will be found in Unit I, pp. 21-22. The reader is referred to these organizations for answers to specific questions within their competence, if he cannot find the information he seeks in the available literature.

*The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, of which nine volumes (to the word Speyer) have appeared, should be consulted for the following:

Aliyah; Colonies, Agricultural; Jewish Colonization Association; Joint Distribution Committee, American Jewish; Migrations; ORT; OSE; Refugees; Social Service.